Advantage Counterplans

**\*\*\*Asteroids/Econ\*\*\*** 3

Asteroid Mining CP 1NC 4

Asteroid Mining CP – 2NC Solvency 5

Asteroid Mining CP – Solves Econ 6

Aff – Solvency 7

Aff – Solvency 8

Aff – Links to Politics 9

**\*\*\*Econ\*\*\*** 10

Tax Increase CP 1NC 11

Tax Increase CP – 2NC Solvency 13

Tax Increase CP – 2NC Solvency 14

Tax Increase CP – Popular 15

Tax Increase CP – A2: Econ Turn 16

Aff – Turn 17

Aff – Turn 18

Aff – Links to Politics (Debt Ceiling) 19

Aff – Links to Politics (Republicans) 20

**\*\*\*Warming\*\*\*** 21

Phase III CP 1NC 22

Phase III CP – Solvency Ext 23

Phase III CP – Solvency Ext 24

Phase III CP – Solvency Ext 25

Phase III CP – Popular 26

Aff – Solvency 27

Aff – Solvency 28

Aff – Miscalc Turn 29

Aff – Conventional Weps Turn 30

Aff – Turn 31

**\*\*\*Heg\*\*\*** 32

Navy Expansion CP 1NC (1/2) 33

Navy Expansion CP – China Solvency 35

Navy Expansion CP – Heg NB 36

Navy Expansion CP – Solvency Ext 37

Navy Expansion CP – More Important than Space 38

Navy Expansion CP – Navy Heg Good (Laundry List) 39

Aff – Links to Politics 40

Aff – NB NUQ 41

Aff – NB NUQ 42

Aff – Space Heg First 43

Aff – China Navy Bad Turn 44

Aff – China Navy Good Turn 45

**\*\*\*Miscalc/China/Cred\*\*\*** 46

NFU CP 1NC (1/2) 47

Solvency – Miscalc 49

Solvency – Miscalc 50

Solvency – China/Credibility 51

Solvency – Credibility (SPT) 52

Solvency – China/Miscalc 53

Aff – Turn 54

\*\*\*Asteroids/Econ\*\*\*

Asteroid Mining CP 1NC

CP Text: The United States federal government should fund NASA’s asteroid detection system and develop and implement a gravity tractor. If the asteroid is detected in a sufficient timeframe, then it should be mined for precious metals and resources.

CP solves their Asteroids advantage and the economy

Mason 09 NASA Falling Short of Asteroid Detection Goals By [Betsy Mason](http://www.wired.com/wiredscience/author/betsymason/)  August 12, 2009  |  5:51 pm http://www.wired.com/wiredscience/2009/08/neoreport/dff

Without more funding, NASA will not meet its goal of tracking 90 percent of all deadly asteroids by 2020, according to a report released today by the National Academy of Sciences. The agency is on track to soon be able to spot 90 percent of the potentially dangerous objects that are at least a kilometer (.6 miles) wide, a goal previously mandated by Congress. Asteroids of this size are estimated to strike Earth once every 500,000 years on average and could be capable of causing a global catastrophe if they hit Earth. In 2008, NASA’s Near Earth Object Program spotted a total of 11,323 objects of all sizes. But without more money in the budget, NASA won’t be able to keep up with a 2005 directive to track 90 percent of objects bigger than 460 feet across. An impact from an asteroid of this size could cause significant damage and be very deadly, particularly if it were to strike near a populated area. Meeting that goal “may require the building of one or more additional observatories, possibly including a space-based observatory,” according to the report. The committee that investigated the issue noted that the United States is getting little help from the rest of the world on this front, and isn’t likely to any time soon. Another report is planned for release by the end of the year that will review what NASA plans to do if we spot a life-threatening asteroid headed our direction

Using the gravity tractor method works

Schweickart et al. 05 Threat Mitigation: The Gravity Tractor (White Paper 042) Russell L Schweickart, B612 Foundation; Piet Hut,

Institute for Advanced Study; Clark Chapman, Dan Durda, Southwest Research Institute. Russell Schweickart, Clark Chapman, Dan Durda, Piet Hut1 http://www.b612foundation.org/papers/wpGT.pdf

The Gravity Tractor (GT) is a fully controlled asteroid deflection concept using the mutual gravity between a robotic spacecraft and an asteroid to slowly accelerate the asteroid in the direction of the "hovering" spacecraft. Based on early warning, provided by ground tracking and orbit prediction, it would be deployed a decade or more prior to a potential impact. Ion engines would be utilized for both the rendezvous with the asteroid and the towing phase. Since the GT does not dock with or otherwise physically contact the asteroid during the deflection process there is no requirement for knowledge of the asteroidís shape, composition, rotation state or other ìconventionalî characteristics. The GT would first reduce the uncertainty in the orbit of the asteroid via Earth tracking of its radio transponder while station keeping with the asteroid. If, after analysis of the more precise asteroid orbit a deflection is indeed indicated, the GT would ìhoverî above the surface of the asteroid in the direction of the required acceleration vector for a duration adequate to achieve the desired velocity change. The orbit of the asteroid is continuously monitored throughout the deflection process and the end state is known in real time. The performance envelope for the GT includes most NEOs which experience close gravitational encounters prior to impact and those below 150-200 meters in diameter on a direct Earth impact trajectory.

Asteroid Mining CP – 2NC Solvency

To continue its asteroid tracking goal by 2020, congress will have to increase funding towards NASA’s asteroid detection program

Johnston 09 (Casey, a graduate of Columbia University with a B.S. in Applied Physics August 13th NASA asteroid-tracking program stalled due to lack of funds. “Ars Technia” <http://arstechnica.com/science/news/2009/08/nasa-asteroid-tracking-program-stalled-due-to-lack-of-funds.ars>)

The risk of an asteroid rending civilization into bits is a favorite scenario in disaster movies, but it has been none too popular with the United States government. Eleven years ago, Congress tasked NASA with detecting, tracking, and classifying large asteroids and comets that pose a threat to Earth; these are generically termed near earth objects, or NEOs. Since then, save for a small grant, NASA has funded the project on its own. Now Congress has created new goals for the program and requested that they be achieved by 2020. The National Research Committee has put out an interim report on the NEO project, and it indicates that very little progress has been made since 2005, primarily due to a lack of funding. Congress kicked off the NEO-tracking project in 1998, requiring that NASA's equipment be able to locate and identify at least 90 percent of all NEOs one kilometer in diameter or larger. Congress selected this size as the lower bound because it is the smallest size that might be globally catastrophic if it ran into Earth. To guarantee a catastrophe, an asteroid would have to be even larger, perhaps 1.5 to 2 kilometers. On impact, an asteroid of this size would create a fireball the size of a continent and a crater fifteen times the asteroid's diameter; if it hits the ocean, there would be an enormous tsunami. Congress awarded NASA a $1.6 million grant in 1999 to put towards the NEO discovery program. Unfortunately, this was the only funding Congress gave to NASA to pursue this goal; nonetheless, NASA continued the project on its own, and has since successfully achieved the objective of a 90 percent track rate for 1km NEOs. The problem now, the NRC report asserts, is that we shouldn't be satisfied with this. What NASA has accomplished so far will largely enable us to at least attempt to prevent any impacts that would ultimately cause the majority of humans that survive the initial blow to die of starvation. However, asteroids smaller than 1km in diameter are not sufficiently less disastrous than their larger counterparts that we can happily ignore them. For example, the NRC report states that the body that caused the 1908 Tunguska explosion and destroyed 2,000 square kilometers of Siberian forest was only 30-40 meters in diameter. This realization is what led Congress to change its mind and decide that NASA should track even smaller asteroids. The new goal: track 90 percent of NEOs 140 meters or larger in diameter by 2020. The NRC report primarily takes issue with the lack of action on this goal from anyone involved: Congress has not volunteered funding for their mandate, and NASA has not allotted any of their budget to it, either. The equipment currently in use to track NEOs can easily see the 1km monsters, but it's not sensitive enough to track the 140m asteroids. As a result, if a Tunguska-sized body were headed for Earth today, its arrival would probably be a complete surprise. Of course, the Tunguska explosion is the only collision of this sort in recorded history, suggesting that threatening bodies that cross Earth's path are fortunately rare. Considering this, and the fact that the most disastrous varieties of asteroids are fairly well covered, danger is probably not imminent. However, Congress is not doing its own deadline any favors by squaring off with NASA over funding. The committee that produced the interim report has been asked to focus in particular with evaluating whether the established NEO discovery goals should be modified. The report is decidedly in favor of tracking the smallest asteroids possible, given that even small NEOs have significant potential for destruction. But for the NEO program to move forward toward any goal, Congress will have to pay up.

Asteroid Mining CP – Solves Econ

Precious resources from asteroids give us ridiculous profit returns

Sonter 06 Asteroid Mining: Key to the Space Economy by Mark Sonter, National Space Society an independent scientific consultant working in the Australian mining and metallurgical industries, providing advice on radiation protection, industrial hygiene, safety, and remediation of radioactively contaminated sitesDate: 09 February 2006 Time: 06:51 AM ET <http://www.space.com/2032-asteroid-mining-key-space-economy.html>

The Near Earth Asteroids offer both threat and promise. They present the threat of planetary impact with regional or global disaster. And they also offer the promise of resources to support humanity's long-term prosperity on Earth, and our movement into space and the solar system. The technologies needed to return asteroidal resources to Earth Orbit (and thus catalyze our colonization of space) will also enable the deflection of at least some of the impact-threat objects. We should develop these technologies, with all due speed! Development and operation of future in-orbit infrastructure (for example, orbital hotels, satellite solar power stations, earth-moon transport node satellites, zero-g manufacturing facilities) will require large masses of materials for construction, shielding, and ballast; and also large quantities of propellant for station-keeping and orbit-change maneuvers, and for fuelling craft departing for lunar or interplanetary destinations. Spectroscopic studies suggest, and 'ground-truth' chemical assays of meteorites confirm, that a wide range of resources are present in asteroids and comets, including nickel-iron metal, silicate minerals, semiconductor and platinum group metals, water, bituminous hydrocarbons, and trapped or frozen gases including carbon dioxide and ammonia. As one startling pointer to the unexpected riches in asteroids, many stony and stony-iron meteorites contain Platinum Group Metals at grades of up to 100 ppm (or 100 grams per ton). Operating open pit platinum and gold mines in South Africa and elsewhere mine ores of grade 5 to 10 ppm, so grades of 10 to 20 times higher would be regarded as spectacular if available in quantity, on Earth. Water is an obvious first, and key, potential product from asteroid mines, as it could be used for return trip propulsion via steam rocket. About 10% of Near-Earth Asteroids are energetically more accessible (easier to get to) than the Moon (i.e. under 6 km/s from LEO), and a substantial minority of these have return-to-Earth transfer orbit injection delta-v's of only 1 to 2 km/s. Return of resources from some of these NEAs to low or high earth orbit may therefore be competitive versus earth-sourced supplies. Our knowledge of asteroids and comets has expanded dramatically in the last ten years, with images and spectra of asteroids and comets from flybys, rendezvous, and impacts (for example asteroids Gaspra, Ida, Mathilde, the vast image collection from Eros, Itokawa, and others; comets Halley, Borrelly, Tempel-1, and Wild-2. And radar images of asteroids Toutatis, Castalia, Geographos, Kleopatra, Golevka and other... These images show extraordinary variations in structure, strength, porosity, surface features. The total number of identified NEAs has increased from about 300 to more than 3,000 in the period 1995 to 2005. The most accessible group of NEAs for resource recovery is a subset of the Potentially Hazardous Asteroids (PHAs). These are bodies (about 770 now discovered) which approach to within 7.5 million km of earth orbit. The smaller subset of those with orbits which are earth-orbit-grazing give intermittently very low delta-v return opportunities (that is it is easy velocity wise to return to Earth). These are also the bodies which humanity should want to learn about in terms of surface properties and strength so as to plan deflection missions, in case we should ever find one on a collision course with us. Professor John Lewis has pointed out (in Mining the Sky) that the resources of the solar system (the most accessible of which being those in the NEAs) can permanently support in first-world comfort some quadrillion people. In other words, the resources of the solar system are essentially infinite... And they are there for us to use, to invest consciousness into the universe, no less. It's time for humankind to come out of its shell, and begin to grow!! So both for species protection and for the expansion of humanity into the solar system, we need to characterize these objects and learn how to mine and manage them. Once we learn how to work on, handle, and modify the orbits of small near-earth objects, we will have achieved, as a species, both the capability to access the vast resources of the asteroids, and also the capability to protect our planet from identified collision threats. Mark Sonter is an independent scientific consultant working in the Australian mining and metallurgical industries, providing advice on radiation protection, industrial hygiene, safety, and remediation of radioactively contaminated sites. His career includes 2 years as a high school science teacher, 6 years as a University Physics lecturer in Papua New Guinea, postgraduate studies in medical physics, and 28 years in uranium mining radiation safety management, including 5 years as Corporate Safety Manager for a major mining corporation. Mark was a visiting scholar at U of Arizona in 1995, and during 1995-97 wrote a research thesis on the Technical and Economic Feasibility of Mining the Near-Earth Asteroids. He was granted funding by the Foundation for International Non-governmental Development of Space (FINDS) to develop concepts for mining the near-Earth asteroids

Aff – Solvency

The gravity tractor only works when there is 30 years of notice. The cp doesn’t solve for unanticipated asteroids

Lovgren 05 "Gravity Tractor" Could Deflect Earth-Bound Asteroids Stefan Lovgren for National Geographic News November 9, 2005 Nat Geo contributer <http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2005/11/1109_051109_asteroid_tug.html>

With the gravity plan, a spacecraft would not have to dock on the asteroid, but instead hover above its surface. The craft's thruster jets would angle outward to avoid blasting the asteroid's surface and pushing it away. "You would use this small gravity force between the [spacecraft and the asteroid] as your towline to basically pull this thing," Lu explained. "We had looked at landing on the surface [of an asteroid] and all the problems associated with that, when we found that the gravitational force is about equal to the force that you plan to be pushing with anyhow," he said. "We realized, Wow, rather than pushing, why don't we just pull?" The astronauts calculate that, given a lead time of about 20 years, NASA could launch a spacecraft that could safely deflect an asteroid some 650 feet (200 meters) across in about a year of "towing."

We’re not even close to being able to develop this technology and the cost and timeframe of using this technology is too much

BBC 09 British plan to tackle asteroids Monday, 31 August 2009 <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/science/nature/8230138.stm>

However, the idea is still in its early stages and the company says a prototype is some way off from being built. The tractor would steer asteroids away from the Earth The US space agency's (Nasa) Near Earth Object programme reports on its website that it has recorded 1068 known "Potentially Hazardous Asteroids", however there are thousands more estimated to be present in space. Dr Ralph Cordey, who is EADS Astrium's head of exploration and business, told BBC News that the concept of a gravity tug was actually first mooted by two Nasa astronauts, Edward Lu and Stanley Love, a few years ago. He said: "Frankly, I thought it was crackers. I thought it would never work." But he said after reconsidering the idea and focusing on specific engineering issues, including the size of the spacecraft, and long-term propulsion methods, it was considered by the team to be potentially feasible. The tractor would intercept the asteroid from just 48m away and exert a small gravitational force on it, pulling the rock towards it. The pair would then embark on a slightly different orbit, away from the Earth. It could possibly be powered using solar panels. However, the device would have to be launched at least 15 years before any predicted collision and would need a team to monitor it from the ground during this time. Dr Cordey said the company had worked with a number of space authorities on other methods of protecting the Earth from asteroids but this one would be able to target a wider range. He said: "We have done quite a lot of design work on this with the European Space Agency and we believe this would work just as well on a big solid iron asteroid as well as other types." But the high cost implications mean that before the device could be made, it would have to be commissioned by a government or a group of governments working together

Aff – Solvency

Gravity Tractor costs ridiculous amounts of money and takes forever to research – its just in its beginning stages.

By Kevin Hall 09 editor at dvice (dot) com 4:27PM on Sep 1, 2009 Britain plans 'gravity tractor' to protect Earth from asteroids <http://dvice.com/archives/2009/09/britain-plans-g.php>

The idea's been proposed and kiboshed before, but a team of British scientists and engineers are taking a look at gravity as one way to protect the Earth from asteroids. NASA's Near Earth Object program currently has 145 potentially hazardous asteroids on its list out of 1,062 objects larger than one kilometer in diameter, and 6,292 total discovered objects. What's all that mean? Well, that there's a lot of stuff out there that could potentially impact our planet — some of it pretty big. So instead of sending shuttle crews up at the last minute to blow an approaching asteroid up, British astronomers at the Astrophysics Research Centre are planning to build a 10-ton "gravity tractor" spacecraft that will influence the object's trajectory. The process would take some time — a craft would have to be launched 15 years in advance to really have an effect — but, once the tractor arrives, it'd hover close by an asteroid and gently guide it along a different path. Besides the inordinate amount of time it'd take, the "gravity tractor" program — still in its early stages — would cost so much and require so much in terms of personnel that it would take either the backing of a government or several to ever see it through.

Aff – Links to Politics

Congress has already shown their intent to stop funding asteroid tracking

Johnston ’09 (Casey, August 19, Graduate of Columbia University with a B.S. in Applied Physics, Associate Writer for ARS Technica, “NASA asteroid-tracking program stalled due to lack of funds” <http://arstechnica.com/science/news/2009/08/nasa-asteroid-tracking-program-stalled-due-to-lack-of-funds.ars> DOA: 7/21/11 ARW)

The risk of an asteroid rending civilization into bits is a favorite scenario in disaster movies, but it has been none too popular with the United States government. Eleven years ago, Congress tasked NASA with detecting, tracking, and classifying large asteroids and comets that pose a threat to Earth; these are generically termed near earth objects, or NEOs. Since then, save for a small grant, NASA has funded the project on its own. Now Congress has created new goals for the program and requested that they be achieved by 2020. The National Research Committee has put out an interim report on the NEO project, and it indicates that very little progress has been made since 2005, primarily due to a lack of funding.

\*\*\*Econ\*\*\*

Tax Increase CP 1NC

Text: The United States federal government should raise the marginal tax rate in the United States to 70 percent on incomes over $15 million, to 60 percent on incomes between $5 million and $15 million, and to 50 percent on incomes between $500,000 and $5 million.

The counterplan solves current crisis, reduces future deficits, and it is set high enough that loopholes can be exploited to make it manageable for the taxed while still helping the economy.

Robert Reich 11 Fmr. Secretary of Labor; Professor at Berkeley; Author, Aftershock: 'The Next Economy and America's Future' Why We Must Raise Taxes on the Rich Posted: 04/ 4/11 03:33 PM

It's tax time. It's also a time when right-wing Republicans are setting the agenda for massive spending cuts that will hurt most Americans. Here's the truth: The only way America can reduce the long-term budget deficit, maintain vital services, protect Social Security and Medicare, invest more in education and infrastructure, and not raise taxes on the working middle class is by raising taxes on the super rich. Even if we got rid of corporate welfare subsidies for big oil, big agriculture, and big Pharma -- even if we cut back on our bloated defense budget -- it wouldn't be nearly enough. The vast majority of Americans can't afford to pay more. Despite an economy that's twice as large as it was thirty years ago, the bottom 90 percent are still stuck in the mud. If they're employed they're earning on average only about $280 more a year than thirty years ago, adjusted for inflation. That's less than a 1 percent gain over more than a third of a century. (Families are doing somewhat better but that's only because so many families now have to rely on two incomes.) Yet even as their share of the nation's total income has withered, the tax burden on the middle has grown. Today's working and middle-class taxpayers are shelling out a bigger chunk of income in payroll taxes, sales taxes, and property taxes than thirty years ago. It's just the opposite for super rich. The top 1 percent's share of national income has doubled over the past three decades (from 10 percent in 1981 to well over 20 percent now). The richest one-tenth of 1 percent's share has tripled. And they're doing better than ever. According to a new analysis by the Wall Street Journal, total compensation and benefits at publicly-traded Wall Street banks and securities firms hit a record in 2010 -- $135 billion. That's up 5.7 percent from 2009. Yet, remarkably, taxes on the top have plummeted. From the 1940s until 1980, the top tax income tax rate on the highest earners in America was at least 70 percent. In the 1950s, it was 91 percent. Now it's 35 percent. Even if you include deductions and credits, the rich are now paying a far lower share of their incomes in taxes than at any time since World War II. The estate tax (which only hits the top 2 percent) has also been slashed. In 2000 it was 55 percent and kicked in after $1 million. Today it's 35 percent and kicks in at $5 million. Capital gains -- comprising most of the income of the super-rich -- were taxed at 35 percent in the late 1980s. They're now taxed at 15 percent. If the rich were taxed at the same rates they were half a century ago, they'd be paying in over $350 billion more this year alone, which translates into trillions over the next decade. That's enough to accomplish everything the nation needs while also reducing future deficits. If we also cut what we don't need (corporate welfare and bloated defense), taxes could be reduced for everyone earning under $80,000, too. And with a single payer health-care system -- Medicare for all -- instead of a gaggle of for-profit providers, the nation could save billions more. Yes, the rich will find ways to avoid paying more taxes courtesy of clever accountants and tax attorneys. But this has always been the case regardless of where the tax rate is set. That's why the government should aim high. (During the 1950s, when the top rate was 91 percent, the rich exploited loopholes and deductions that as a practical matter reduced the effective top rate 50 to 60 percent -- still substantial by today's standards.) And yes, some of the super rich will move their money to the Cayman Islands and other tax shelters. But paying taxes is a central obligation of citizenship, and those who take their money abroad in an effort to avoid paying American taxes should lose their American citizenship. But don't the super-rich have enough political power to kill any attempt to get them to pay their fair share? Only if we let them. Here's the issue around which Progressives, populists on the right and left, unionized workers, and all other working people who are just plain fed up ought to be able to unite. Besides, the reason we have a Democrat in the White House -- indeed, the reason we have a Democratic Party at all -- is to try to rebalance the economy exactly this way. All the president has to do is connect the dots -- the explosion of income and wealth among America's super-rich, the dramatic drop in their tax rates, the consequential devastating budget squeezes in Washington and in state capitals, and the slashing of vital public services for the middle class and the poor. This shouldn't be difficult. Most Americans are on the receiving end. By now they know trickle-down economics is a lie. And they sense the dice are loaded in favor of the multimillionaires and billionaires, and their corporations, now paying a relative pittance in taxes.

Tax Increase CP – 2NC Solvency

Tax rates for the upper class should return to what they were pre Reagan

Robert Reich 11 Fmr. Secretary of Labor; Professor at Berkeley; Author, osted: February 15, 2011 10:33 PM

Why We Should Raise Taxes on the Super-Rich and Lower Them on the Middle Class http://www.huffingtonpost.com/robert-reich/why-we-should-raise-taxes\_b\_823822.html

My proposal to raise the marginal tax to 70 percent on incomes over $15 million, to 60 percent on incomes between $5 million and $15 million, and to 50 percent on incomes between $500,000 and $5 million, has generated considerable debate. Some progressives think it's pie-in-the-sky. Here, for example, is Andrew Leonard, a staff writer for Salon: A 70 percent tax bracket for the richest Americans is pure fantasy -- even suggesting it represents such a fundamental disconnect with the world as it exists today that it is hard to see why it should be taken seriously. I would be deeply worried about the sanity of a Democratic president who proposed such a thing. Fantasy? I don't know Mr. Leonard's age but perhaps he could be forgiven for not recalling that between the late 1940s and 1980 America's highest marginal rate averaged above 70 percent. Under Republican President Dwight Eisenhower it was 91 percent. Not until the 1980s did Ronald Reagan slash it to 28 percent. (Many considered Reagan's own proposal a "fantasy" before it was enacted.) Incidentally, during these years the nation's pre-tax income was far less concentrated at the top than it is now. In the mid-1970s, for example, the top 1 percent got around 9 percent of total income. By 2007, they got 23.5 percent. So if anything, the argument for a higher marginal tax should be even more realistic now than it was during the days when it was taken for granted. A disconnect with the world as it exists today? That's exactly the point of proposing it. For years progressives have whined that Democratic presidents (Clinton, followed by Obama) compromise with Republicans while Republican presidents (Reagan through W) stand their ground -- with the result that the center of political debate has moved steadily rightward. That's the reason the world exists the way it does today. Isn't it about time progressives had the courage of our conviction and got behind what we believe in, in the hope of moving the debate back to where it was? Would a Democratic president be insane to propose such a thing? Not at all. In fact, polls show an increasing portion of the electorate angry with an insider "establishment" -- on Wall Street, in corporate suites, and in Washington -- that's been feathering its nest at the public's expense. The Tea Party is but one manifestation of a widening perception that the game is rigged in favor of the rich and powerful. More importantly, it will soon become evident to most Americans that the only way to reduce the budget deficit, preserve programs deemed essential by the middle class, and not raise taxes on the middle, is to tax the top. In fact, a Democratic president should propose a major permanent tax reduction on the middle class and working class. I suspect most of the public would find this attractive. But here again, the only way to accomplish this without busting the bank is to raise taxes on the rich.

Tax Increase CP – 2NC Solvency

The deficit is at an all time high, we need to act now and raise taxes for the rich

Brian O'Neill 11 (Raising taxes on the rich makes dollars and sense Sunday, July 17, 2011 writer for the Pittsburgh post gazzete

By Brian O'Neill, Pittsburgh Post-Gazette Read more: http://www.post-gazette.com/pg/11198/1160713-155-0.stm#ixzz1StQwU8ob)

At any time of national crisis, Americans generally ask one question: What's in it for me? This game of chicken that Congress is playing with the White House over the national debt limit is no different, and so it seems time for a history lesson. Except for a few years under President Andy Jackson, the U.S. has always had debt on the books. As long as that was just a fraction of the economy and we paid it down between wars, debt didn't matter much. Some of us even remember those peaceful, prosperous 1990s when Washington finally took the scissors to the national credit card. You can credit President Bill Clinton, the Republican-led Congress or both, but the annual deficit started plummeting around 1996 and we even started running an annual surplus by the late '90s. Then the second President Bush took office and decided that wouldn't do. In May 2001, Congress passed his tax cuts, with a dozen Democrats joining 46 Republicans to get the bill over the hump in the Senate. The premise was two-fold: 1) The surplus was so big we'd just be returning the overcharge. 2) This would be anti-recession insurance. That turned out to be a double-crock. The surplus vanished. The nation borrowed so much that by fiscal 2008, the annual deficit topped $1 trillion. The cumulative national debt rose from $5.75 trillion in January 2001 to $10.7 trillion at the end of 2008. A couple of wars had a lot to do with that, but so did a second round of tax cuts in 2003. Many at the time -- including Republican Sen. John McCain -- warned this would send the deficit ever higher, but Vice President Dick "Deficits Don't Matter'' Cheney broke the 50-50 Senate tie and approved the bill. Fast-forward to the Obama administration, which has now broken the all-time deficit records set under President Ronald Reagan and the Presidents Bush. President Obama's attempts to kick-start the economy (which included a tax cut) have ushered in successive deficits of $1.9 trillion and $1.65 trillion. America is now more than $14 trillion in debt and borrowing 40 cents on every dollar it spends. So much for that supply-side fairy that was supposed to cut taxes, finance two wars (oops, make that three) and still leave a balanced budget. Meantime, Democrats and Republicans have never seemed further apart. Republican Mike Kelly, the freshman congressman from Butler, sees this entirely as a spending problem, not a revenue problem. He points to President Obama's stimulus bill and a steep rise in non-defense discretionary spending, and quotes the Obama of 2009 who said, "You don't raise taxes during a recession.'' Rep. Mike Doyle, D-Forest Hills, also is against a tax increase this year but notes that the national debt limit was raised seven times under George W. Bush. Mr. Doyle, who has been in Congress since 1995, voted against the Bush tax cuts in 2001, favoring a smaller cut and presciently telling a reporter then: "Let's make sure the [surplus] money is there.'' It wasn't -- and now, Mr. Doyle says, House Republicans "don't seem to think putting the country in default is like a big deal. If it wouldn't hurt so many people, I'd like to see that theory tested so people can see how crazy they are.'' The old days of compromise in Washington are history. For hard-liners, it's as if the Bush tax cuts were handed down from Mount Sinai, and never mind that they didn't work. Married couples shalt not pay 35 cents on dollars earned above $209,000. They shalt instead pay 33 cents, forever and ever, amen. The rhetoric seems all out of proportion with the issue. The proposed changes of a few percentage points on high-end incomes would not even raise the top rate as high as it was for most of the Reagan administration, and the rates wouldn't go up until 2013. Everyone, rich and poor, would also get to keep the tax cuts we enjoy below that. But never mind. I'm clearly talking heresy. We mustn't even consider a future tax hike that would have couples earning $250,000 paying about $15 more each week in taxes. We'll cut our way out of a $14 trillion deficit, and if interest rates go up because the world sees U.S. credit as shaky, well, that supply-side fairy should be along any day now.

Tax Increase CP – Popular

CP rallies democratic base around Obama – increases pol cap

Munro 7/23 (Neil, writer for the Dailey Caller, “Boehner derails tax increase, Obama’s 2012 plan” <http://dailycaller.com/2011/07/23/boehner-derails-tax-increase-obamas-2012-plan/>)

Obama’s favored approach, had it been approved, would have boosted his claims to swing-voters that he is a consensus builder in Washington, and that he is a political moderate willing to approve modest spending cuts. Obama’s deal would also have required a tax increase — something sure to split the GOP caucus and rally the Democratic Party around the president at a time leading up to the 2012 election. But the dramatic and last-minute failure of the talks may gravely marginalize Obama’s claims of being a post-partisan fiscal moderate. If the Republicans craft a fallback deal with the Senate, it would sideline the president and embolden Republican legislators and Tea Party supporters. Senate Democrats are reluctant to work with Boehner, and may agree only to a stripped-down deal that does not require them to approve painful budget cuts prior to the 2012 election. The Democrats have only a four-vote majority in the Senate and are loath to risk one of their members losing re-election or their current majority status.

CP avoids the politics net benefit. Tax increases for the rich are popular with the public

Thomma 11 Posted on Monday, April 18, 2011 Poll: Best way to fight deficits: Raise taxes on the rich By Steven Thomma | McClatchy Newspapers <http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2011/04/18/112386/poll-best-way-to-fight-deficits.html>

WASHINGTON — Alarmed by rising national debt and increasingly downbeat about their country's course, Americans are clear about how they want to attack the government's runway budget deficits: raise taxes on the wealthy and keep hands off of Medicare and Medicaid. At the same time, they say that the government should not raise the legal debt ceiling, which the government must do soon to borrow more money, despite warnings that failing to do so would force the government into default, credit markets into turmoil and the economy into a tailspin. Those are among the findings of a national McClatchy-Marist poll taking the country's pulse just as President Barack Obama and Congress launch what could be a multi-year debate on the role of government and how to finance it. Obama heads to northern Virginia on Tuesday and California on Wednesday to pitch his long-term budget proposals, as lawmakers from Congress are taking a spring recess, with most in their home districts. On tackling the deficit, voters by a margin of 2-to-1 support raising taxes on incomes above $250,000, with 64 percent in favor and 33 percent opposed. Independents supported higher taxes on the wealthy by 63-34 percent; Democrats by 83-15 percent; and Republicans opposed by 43-54 percent. Support for higher taxes rose by 5 percentage points after Obama called for that as one element of his deficit-reduction strategy last week. Opposition dropped by 6 points. The poll was conducted before and after the speech.

Tax Increase CP – A2: Econ Turn

All arguments against raising taxes are wrong. Schaller says so.

Schaller 11 Taxing the rich: good policy, good politics Thomas Schaller says it's time to raise taxes on the wealthy April 05, 2011|By Thomas F. Schaller

*Thomas F. Schaller teaches political science at UMBC.* <http://articles.baltimoresun.com/2011-04-05/news/bs-ed-schaller-20110405_1_tax-cuts-income-taxes-alternative-minimum-tax>

If national Democrats and Republicans won't say it, if neither President Barack Obama (now officially declared for re-election) nor newly minted Speaker John Boehner (just four months after capturing the House gavel) will either, I guess I have to: It's time to raise income taxes, especially on the wealthiest. America has deficit and long-term debt problems. Like any budget morass, there are two general categories of solutions — spend less or raise more. It's really that simple. These are not mutually exclusive choices; ideally, we can and should do both. But as I explained in my previous column, despite the public outcry over rising deficits, opinion surveys show that Americans have little to no appetite for cutting spending on specific programs, except for a few small-budget items like foreign aid. So that leaves raising taxes. I know all the arguments against raising taxes. Actually, they are variations on just one argument: Doing so will stifle the economy just when it is poised for recovery. But if stimulating recovery is the goal, there are a number of ways the government can do that. When the Congressional Budget Office a year ago examined which among 11 possible governmental actions — including extending unemployment benefits, investing in infrastructure, issuing Social Security recipients an extra payment, raising business investment deductions, easing the Alternative Minimum Tax limit, and three variations on a payroll tax holiday — guess which option was deemed to be least stimulative? You guessed it: cutting income taxes. But even in normal times, don't higher tax rates for the wealthy slow economic growth? Nope. Using Bureau of Economic Analysis data, the Congressional Research Service last October produced a report comparing economic performance from 1993 to 2000, under the tax policies enacted by George H.W. Bush and Bill Clinton, with 2003 to 2007 after two rounds of income tax cuts shepherded through Congress by George W. Bush. The results? The gross domestic product growth rate during the first period was 3.9 percent but 2.7 percent in the second; median real household income growth in the first period was 1.7 percent but just 0.6 percent in the second; private-sector employment growth was 2.7 percent before the Bush 43 tax cuts, but it fell to 1.2 percent after. And these data are for the most prosperous years of the Bush presidency, before the 2008 economic collapse. You'd think that making the argument that income tax cuts for the richest Americans fuels the economy would first require that the economy actually perform better when rates were lower. But apparently such logic only applies on Mars, or other places where one can't watch Fox News. Still, isn't it unfair to soak the rich? Here's what to say to people who complain about policy unfairness: In the three decades since the 1980 Ronald Reagan-led tax revolution, only the top 20 percent of Americans realized net after-tax wealth gains. The bottom 80 percent have seen their inflation-adjusted incomes fall. If America is slouching toward socialism, it is a form of socialism in which tax law redistributes income upward, not downward. What's most puzzling about the devotion to tax cuts no matter the economic situation is that raising taxes on the wealthiest is quite popular. Polls repeatedly show that a plurality if not majority of Americans support keeping current tax rates for middle-class Americans while letting the Bush-era tax cuts for the wealthiest expire and return to Clinton-era levels. Had Mr. Obama let the tax cuts for the wealthiest expire, the government would have recovered about $36 billion in lost revenues this year. If that sounds like a drop in the pail, remember that after repeated promises made during last year's election to restore fiscal sanity, the new House Republican majority, fueled by the tea party revolutionaries, proposed a paltry $61 billion in new spending cuts. So, to review: Raising taxes on the wealthiest won't lead to socialist redistribution, improves economic growth, is popular, and would reduce the deficit. Why, then, do politicians climb over each other to extend these tax cuts? Short answer: The wealthy exert disproportionate power in our political system. There's no other conclusion to reach. As USA Today reported a year ago, America's tax burden is lower today than at any point since 1950. In the immediate aftermath of the economic crisis, keeping taxes low made sense; we were experiencing a financial meltdown caused by deregulation and greed, some of it fostered by the very people in the top income brackets who reaped millions if not billions along the way. But whether they were responsible or not, the vast majority of the nation's wealthiest citizens came out just fine on the other end of the 2008 economic crisis. So it's time to raise tax rates to what they were a decade ago on those who have financially benefited the most during the past three decades. It will be good for the economy, good for the U.S. Treasury — and good politics, too.

Aff – Turn

Increasing taxes on the wealthy disincentivizes business investments – crashes the economy

Baltimore Sun 10 Raising taxes on the rich is bad for everybody

December 01, 2010 <http://articles.baltimoresun.com/2010-12-01/news/bs-ed-bush-tax-cuts-letter-20101201_1_income-tax-taxable-interest-income-tax-rates>

Allowing the Bush tax cuts to expire for families earning more than $250,000 per year seems reasonable until one digs further into the economic facts. IRS income tax statistics show that the top 3 percent of earners pay more of the total income tax bill today than ever. In 2008, they paid 51.5 percent of all income taxes, though they earned just 28.8 percent of the income. In 2001, by comparison, they paid 46.2 percent of all income taxes, and earned 26.1 percent of income. Under President Obama's plan, top tax rates on the highest incomes will rise to 39.6 percent from about 35 percent now. And that doesn't count the jump in capital gains tax rates to 20 percent from 15 percent. What many Americans don't know is "the rich" are in fact the most likely to start or fund a new business or to expand a small enterprise. Economist Alan Viand of the American Enterprise Institute recently noted: "Households with incomes above $200,000 received 47 percent of the taxable interest income, 60 percent of the dividends, and a staggering 84 percent of the net capital gains reported on tax returns." In other words, these people are investors and entrepreneurs. This is key, since small businesses and start ups account for the bulk of all new jobs, 80 percent by some estimates. And why letting taxes rise on higher earners is a bad idea for all. The National Federation of Independent Business data show that 75 percent of all small businesses are so-called "pass-through entities," i.e. partnerships, sole proprietors, S corporations and other set-ups. A lot of those small-business profits are declared on personal income tax returns by wealthy taxpayers. How much? In 2011, Congress' Joint Committee on Taxation estimates taxpayers subject to the higher rates will earn 50 percent of all small-business income. So this isn't just about giving "rich" people a tax cut; it's about jobs and small businesses at a time when America needs both.

****Aff – Turn****

**Raising taxes on the rich is bad for everybody**

**Frederick 10**, (Benedict Jr. <http://articles.baltimoresun.com/2010-12-01/news/bs-ed-bush-tax-cuts-letter-20101201_1_income-tax-taxable-interest-income-tax-rates>)

Allowing the Bush tax cuts to expire for families earning more than $250,000 per year seems reasonable until one digs further into the economic facts.

IRS income tax statistics show that the top 3 percent of earners pay more of the total income tax bill today than ever. In 2008, they paid 51.5 percent of all income taxes, though they earned just 28.8 percent of the income. In 2001, by comparison, they paid 46.2 percent of all income taxes, and earned 26.1 percent of income. Under President Obama's plan, top tax rates on the highest incomes will rise to 39.6 percent from about 35 percent now. And that doesn't count the jump in capital gains tax rates to 20 percent from 15 percent. What many Americans don't know is "the rich" are in fact the most likely to start or fund a new business or to expand a small enterprise. Economist Alan Viand of the American Enterprise Institute recently noted: "Households with incomes above $200,000 received 47 percent of the taxable interest income, 60 percent of the dividends, and a staggering 84 percent of the net capital gains reported on tax returns." In other words, these people are investors and entrepreneurs. This is key, since small businesses and start ups account for the bulk of all new jobs, 80 percent by some estimates. And why letting taxes rise on higher earners is a bad idea for all. The National Federation of Independent Business data show that 75 percent of all small businesses are so-called "pass-through entities," i.e. partnerships, sole proprietors, S corporations and other set-ups. A lot of those small-business profits are declared on personal income tax returns by wealthy taxpayers. How much? In 2011, Congress' Joint Committee on Taxation estimates taxpayers subject to the higher rates will earn 50 percent of all small-business income. So this isn't just about giving "rich" people a tax cut; it's about jobs and small businesses at a time when America needs both.

**Letting the rich have their money means they spend it more – that’s a bigger internal link to the economy**

**Eden, 12/15/10** (Michael, “tax cuts increase revenue…start thinking right” <http://startthinkingright.wordpress.com/2010/09/08/tax-cuts-increase-revenues-they-have-always-increased-revenues/>)

We keep seeing the same liberal argument being played over and over again.  As the mainstream media seek to make their case to the American people that the Bush tax cuts should expire, one of the primary strategies being employed is to claim that Republicans are refusing to “pay for” their extension of the tax cuts.  And that therefore the Republicans will hike the deficit.  The problem is that it’s a false premise, based on a static conception of human behavior that refuses to take into account the fact that people’s behavior changes depending upon how much of their money they are allowed to keep, and how much of their money is seized from them in taxation. As bizarre as it might seem, it is seen as perverse these days to suggest that allowing someone to keep more of the money he or she invests would stimulate people to take more risks by investing in businesses and products, and that such increased investment in business and products would in turn stimulate more economic growth.  Common sense has become akin to rocket science these days.

Aff – Links to Politics (Debt Ceiling)

Obama would have to use significant political capital to get tax raises passed – it derails debt ceiling.

Xinhua News 7/23 (“Obama presses Republicans to agree on tax increase deal” http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/world/2011-07/23/c\_131003416.htm)

WASHINGTON, July 22 (Xinhua) -- With the Aug. 2 deadline of default looming, U.S. President Barack Obama Friday continued to press the Republicans to accept tax increase on the rich for a " balanced" deficit reduction and debt limit lifting deal."If we're going to reduce our deficit, then the wealthiest Americans and the biggest corporations should do their part as well," Obama said at a town hall meeting at University of Maryland. "Middle-class families shouldn't have to pick up the whole tab for closing the deficit." The U.S. borrowing limit, currently at 14.29 trillion dollars, was reached on May 16 this year. U.S. Treasury Department said the country would default without an agreement to lift the limit by Aug. 2. Republicans have refused to discuss any debt-reduction deal that includes higher taxes, while Democrats have rejected any deal based solely on spending cuts. Currently, the two parties are still in the process of bargaining. Still, Obama noted that there are some sings of compromise. "So this idea of balance, this idea of shared sacrifice, of a deficit plan that includes tough spending cuts but also includes tax reform that raises more revenue -- this isn't just my position ... This is a position that's being taken by people of both parties and no party," Obama said. House Speaker, Republican John Boehner on Friday said that the two parties still have not hammered a deal. "There is no deal. There is no agreement in private" with Democrats, Boehner said.

Aff – Links to Politics (Republicans)

CP angers republicans

Munro 7/23 (Neil, writer for the Dailey Caller, “Boehner derails tax increase, Obama’s 2012 plan” <http://dailycaller.com/2011/07/23/boehner-derails-tax-increase-obamas-2012-plan/>)

Boehner refused to agree to tax increases that Obama demanded at the last minute. The increases amounted to $400 billion, Boehner said. (Obama: I’ve been left at the altar) “There was an agreement [for] $800 billion on [extra] revenue … [but] the President walked away from this agreement and demanded more money, and the only way to get that extra revenue was to raise taxes,” he said. In a background press briefing, White House officials said the $800 billion would have come from the expiration of the upper-income tax cuts established during George W. Bush’s presidency. But the extra $400 billion would have come from new taxes that GOP legislators refused to accept, the officials said.

\*\*\*Warming\*\*\*

Phase III CP 1NC

**The USFG should implement phase III of the Regional Carbon Sequestration Partnership program in which large scale sequestration projects will demonstrate the long-term, effective, and safe storage of carbon dioxide.**

**Carbon sequestration key to solving Global Warming**

**Okamoto et al. 05** (I., Research Institute of Innovative Technology for the Earth, “Monitoring CO2 Injection in Sandstone by Laboratory Resistivity Measurements”, <http://www.agu.org/meetings/fm05/fm05-sessions/fm05_GC13A.html> 7/22/11)

CO2 sequestration in a deep aquifer is considered to one of the most effective method to solve Global warming. We must understand the behavior of injected CO2 to examine long-term stability of CO2 sequestration. We tried to monitor the behavior of supercritical CO2 injection in water- saturated sandstone by measuring the resistivity of core samples. The infiltration of CO2 into the core is expected to be detected sharply ,because CO2 is an insulator while the pore water is a conductor We made experimental apparatus that can reproduce the high pressure of the underground. A cylindrical sample of Berea sandstone(50 mm in diameter and 120 mm in length)was used in this study. It was coated with silicone, and current electrodes in both ends of the core. The end electrodes were a circular mesh made of copper. Point electrodes to measure potential were installed along the side of the core. CO2 as both gas, liquid, and supercritical phases was flushed through the sample. Consequentially we could monitor the time-lapse behavior of CO2 in water- saturated sandstone. This study will serve as a reference to the CO2 monitoring on the site.

Phase III CP – Solvency Ext

**Carbon sequestration is cost effective**

**David 2000** (Jeremy, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, “The Cost of Carbon Capture”, pg. 6, [http://sequestration.mit.edu/pdf/David\_and\_Herzog.pdf 7/22/11](http://sequestration.mit.edu/pdf/David_and_Herzog.pdf%207/22/11) PJ)

Based on the studies analyzed, there is a consensus that using today’s capture technology would add 1.5-2¢/kWh to the busbar cost of electricity for an IGCC or NGCC power plant. For a PC plant, the incremental cost of electricity would be over 3¢/kWh. The strongest opportunities for lowering the capture costs in the future were identified as gains in heat rates and reductions in the amount of energy required by the separation. New technologies like coal gasification show the most long-term promise, with incremental costs for CO2 sequestration at IGCC power plants being potentially reduced to about 1¢/kWh in the next decade. Opportunities for future cost reductions will include the investigation of innovative technologies, including new types of power plants and power cycles. Moreover, system-level analyses should be performed to minimize not only capture costs, but also the sequestration costs associated with transportation and injection.

**Carbon sequestration key to solving global warming**

**Ahuja 5/20/04** (Anjana, a British Indian science journalist and columnist for The Times, “A global threat buried”, LexisNexis, 7/22/11 PJ)

Energy companies hope that carbon dioxide - the "villain" of global warming - can be stored safely in underground rock formations for thousands of years. Problem solved. JUST EAST of Houston, Texas, lies an abandoned oilfield. It may be barren but it is by no means redundant. It has just become a testing ground for a technology that could prove crucial in the decades ahead. American scientists have started trucking in lorryloads of liquefied carbon dioxide from a nearby BP oil refinery and pumping it into the rocks that lie above the emptied oil reservoir. Once underground, the theory goes, the gas will invade the mile-deep alternating layers of sand and shale, and push out the salty water that currently fills its pores. Barring any leakages, the gas will remain there for thousands of years, supposedly safely tucked away from the atmosphere and so unable to contribute to climate change. Carbon dioxide is the villain in the drama of global warming. While efforts such as the Kyoto Protocol have focused on getting countries to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions in the future, scientists claim that the pollutants currently being produced must also be dealt with. The answer, some geologists argue, is to trap them underground. This Texan experiment in so-called carbon sequestration -capturing carbon at its point of production and keeping it hidden from the atmosphere -is called the Frio Pilot Test after the Frio Formation, the saline aquifer (water holding rock) atop the oilfield that will hold the gas. The idea of dumping carbon dioxide underground is not new. Since 1996 Esso and Statoil have been taking the carbon produced by the Sleipner West natural gas field off Norway and injecting it into the Utsira Sand, a saline aquifer underneath the North Sea, but until now the technique has not been tried on land. Trapping carbon dioxide in underground rocks is far from untested, though. The technique is already used by oil companies to squeeze every last drop from dwindling reservoirs. The principle is the same -carbon dioxide is pumped in to flush out the oil. The carbon dioxide stays put, giving encouragement to geologists who believe that rock formations really can solve the problem. "While we expect the (carbon dioxide) plume to spread out over a few hundred metres, it should stay buried for thousands of years," says Larry Myer, an engineer at the Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory, which, along with the Oak Ridge National Laboratory, will monitor the Texas site for leaks. "The risk of leakage is critical when storing carbon in brine formations, but I'm optimistic that our test results will show that these formations are safe for carbon sequestration." The Frio Formation is capped with a thick layer of shale, which should keep a lid on leaks. Sideways seepage is expected to be contained by faults at the formation's edges. Statoil says that the carbon dioxide stored in the Sleipner experiment has not leaked. The figures certainly look encouraging -an estimated seven billion tonnes of carbon dioxide is created globally by human activity each year. According to Susan Hovorka, a geologist with the Texas Bureau of Economic Geology, which is leading the Frio Pilot Test, the Frio Formation alone can hold between 200 and 350 billion tonnes of carbon dioxide, or at least 28 years' worth. In the US alone there are an estimated 60,000 similar formations, providing a potential dumping ground for centuries. The Utsira Sand could hold all the carbon dioxide produced by Europe's fossil fuel power stations for 800 years. That, say green groups, is partly the problem -as long as there is a place to banish unwanted carbon, there is little incentive to stop producing it. However, energy companies reject the "out of sight, out of mind" argument. They prefer to call carbon sequestration a "bridging technology" that will ease the transition to cleaner energy sources while meeting soaring demand, especially from the developing world. The CO2 Capture Project -a consortium of, among others, Shell, BP, Statoil, ChevronTexaco, the US Department of Energy and the EU -is optimistic about underground carbon storage. It says that it "intends to address the issue of reducing emissions in a manner that will contribute to an environmentally acceptable and competitively priced continuous energy supply for the world".

Phase III CP – Solvency Ext

**Carbon sequestration results in significant reductions of carbon dioxide**  
Zakaria 2007 (Fareed, hosts CNN’s flagship foreign affairs show, is . Editor-at-Large of TIME Magazine, a Washington Post columnist, and a New York Times bestselling author, “'Cathedral Thinking'; Energy's Future: Until we solve climate change, says [James E. Rogers](http://www.lexisnexis.com:80/lnacui2api/search/XMLCrossLinkSearch.do?bct=A&risb=21_T12404576140&returnToId=20_T12404603825&csi=5774&A=0.19308659889081836&sourceCSI=9369&indexTerm=%23PE0009XEU%23&searchTerm=James%20E.%20Rogers&indexType=P)James E. Rogers -Search using: , , [Description: http://www.lexisnexis.com:80/lnacui2api/images/IconInfo.gif](javascript:showInfoWin(9369,'CSI'))[Biographies Plus News](http://www.lexisnexis.com:80/lnacui2api/search/XMLCrossLinkSearch.do?bct=A&risb=21_T12404576140&returnToId=20_T12404603825&csi=5774&A=0.19308659889081836&sourceCSI=9369&indexTerm=%23PE0009XEU%23&searchTerm=James%20E.%20Rogers&indexType=P) [Description: http://www.lexisnexis.com:80/lnacui2api/images/IconInfo.gif](javascript:showInfoWin(162599,'CSI'))[News, Most Recent 60 Days](http://www.lexisnexis.com:80/lnacui2api/search/XMLCrossLinkSearch.do?bct=A&risb=21_T12404576140&returnToId=20_T12404603825&csi=5774&A=0.19308659889081836&sourceCSI=162599&indexTerm=%23PE0009XEU%23&searchTerm=James%20E.%20Rogers&indexType=P)

, we need even the dirtiest fuel”, LexisNexis, 7/23/11 PJ)

The difficulty with using coal is that when you burn it, it produces significant emissions like sulfur dioxide, nitrogen oxide, mercury and fine particulate, as well as CO2. One of our challenges is to find a way to use this plentiful resource we have and reduce the emissions. We have made significant progress on reduction of sulfur dioxide, nitrogen oxide, mercury and fine particulate over the past several decades. We need now to turn our attention to making significant reductions of CO2. Environmental scientists say to me that coal is 80 percent of the climate-change problem. That is, if you can't solve coal, you're not going to get a handle on global warming. Is that right? It (Coal) primarily plays a role in the 35 to 40 percent of the total U.S. emissions which come from power plants. In fact, one of the statistics is that 85 percent of the incremental emissions of CO2 is going to come from developing countries, primarily China and India. First, we need to make significant investment in the research and development of carbon capture and sequestration. Carbon-capture technology has been with us for a long time; it's the sequestration [taking carbon that has been captured from coal plants and injecting it into the earth in either liquid or gas form] that is the issue. We are experimenting with lots of technologies to capture, but we have yet to do a major sequestration project. My judgment is that more dollars and more focused effort, like a Manhattan or Apollo project, would accelerate the results. Still, it takes going through a couple of generations of technology, having an operating period of three to five years, to see how it works. There is a significant amount of regulation that will have to be written about who has the liability for the CO2 in the ground. There are a lot of technical issues around storage that need to be resolved, and regulations need to be written with respect to that. And the carbon has to be stored near the places where coal is burned. We really have to understand the geology that underpins those areas. We really have to have what I would call cathedral thinking, where we are looking out and saying we need to address this problem over many decades, in the same way the cathedrals of Europe took many decades to build. It is going to take many decades of both mitigation and adaptation to get to the right place on this planet.

**Carbon Sequestration makes good use of resources**

**Clover 05** (Charles, environment editor of the Daily Telegraph, “Capturing carbon may be answer to global warming”, LexisNexis, 7/23/11 PJ)

A NEW generation of safe nuclear power plants and coal-fired stations that capture their carbon emissions could solve the problem of global warming, Prof Sir David King, the Government's chief scientist said yesterday. He told an international conference on climate change set up by Tony Blair that it was "critically important" to investigate the technology of "carbon sequestration". He said he had already been involved in talks with the oil companies to see how a tax-break regime could be constructed so the process could pay for itself, with companies paying to get rid of their carbon in return for paying lower rates of pollution tax. He said a major working experiment with carbon sequestration was needed urgently and should take five or 10 years to produce results. The present infrastructure of oil and gas rigs could be used to pump gas under pressure into wells and, eventually, saline aquifers. "None of us know whether carbon sequestration is feasible but if it is, it is a way of using coal reserves all over the world," he said. He said he had been talking to the Chinese about fitting their latest generation of coal-fired power stations with technology that could be used later to capture carbon. Norway has been using pumped carbon dioxide for several years to push oil and gas out of underground wells and companies have an incentive to do so because Norway has a carbon tax.

Phase III CP – Solvency Ext

Carbon Sequestration is necessary to stabilize greenhouse gases

**U.S. Department of Energy 10/19/09** (“Carbon Sequestration”, [http://www.energy.gov/sciencetech/carbonsequestration.htm 7/23/11](http://www.energy.gov/sciencetech/carbonsequestration.htm%207/23/11) PJ)

[Carbon sequestration](http://www.fossil.energy.gov/programs/sequestration/) is one of the most promising ways for reducing the buildup of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere.  In fact, even under the most optimistic scenarios for energy efficiency gains and the greater use of low- or no-carbon fuels, sequestration will be essential if the world is to stabilize atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gases at acceptable levels.

**Carbon Sequestration in soils solves Global Warming**

**Eco Preservation Society 6/19/2008** (Eco Preservation Society, an actively engaged in sustainably focused programming for the purpose of wildlife conservation and reforestation, “Carbon Sequestration and Storage in soils could Solve Global Warming”, <http://ecopreservationsociety.wordpress.com/2008/06/19/carbon-sequestration-and-storage-in-soils-could-solve-global-warming/> , 7/23/11, PJ)

Soils contain more than twice as much carbon as the atmosphere according to estimates (Food and Agriculture Association of the United Nations, FAO). Increasing the amount of carbon naturally stored in soils could provide the short-term bridge to reduce the impacts of increasing carbon emissions until low-carbon and sustainable technologies can be implemented. A group called Soil Carbon, based in Australia, makes the case for soil carbon storage in a presentation available in English, German, Spanish, Italian, Mexican and Portuguese. The Soil Carbon report includes impressive photographs, such as those above, demonstrating the difference between well-managed and poorly managed soils. The FAO report sheds some doubt on the optimism in the figures presented by Soil Carbon. For example, Soil Carbon calculates the potential for CO2 sequestration in soil by starting from the assumption that soil organic matter can be increased 1% of the total weight of the soils to a depth of 1 meter. By this calculation, Soil Carbon claims a potential increase of 47 tons of carbon per hectare. As reasonable as a simple “1 % increase” may sound, it appears not to be scientifically valid. According to the FAO (FAO report, page 28): the carbon content of dryland soils is estimated to be 4 tons/hectare. Carbon content ranges between 7 tons and 24 tons in normal (non-depleted) soils, depending on the climate zone and vegetation. Studies show that non-degraded savannahs can have up to 18 tons C/hectare (top 20 cm). Based on this, one can conclude that an increased carbon sequestration of 18 – 4 = 14 tons/hectare is the most optimistic potential achievement, well under the 47 tons/hectare that Soil Carbon suggests is achievable. Nonetheless, the FAO report point out that increasing the carbon content by only 1.5 tons/hectare on 2 billion hectares of degraded lands could balance out predicted increases in CO2 concentrations in the atmosphere due to annual emissions increases. This would buy time while fossil-fuel free technologies are developed. The most interesting facet of the FAO report for the non-scientist may be the discussions of using funding available from carbon offsetting to implement soil restoration projects and help farmers apply methods which benefit soil carbon levels. The additional income from carbon offsetting would help alleviate poverty, and the more productive farming possible after restoration of soils could break farmers out of the cycle of land depletion for mere survival. Although the development of accurate models to measure carbon offsets and the implementation of measures to reduce the risk of reversal of the gains present obstacles, the prospect of carbon sequestration in soils is a win-win for developed and developing nations.

Phase III CP – Popular

Plan is popular with energy lobbies, dems, and republicans.

Snow 7/22/11 (Nick, OGJ Washington Editor, State utility regulators call for more CCS-EOR projects, <http://www.pennenergy.com/index/petroleum/display/0570992321/articles/pennenergy/petroleum/exploration/2011/07/state-utility_regulators.html> MG)

NARUC members passed the resolution after North Dakota’s two US senators, Kent Conrad (D) and John Hoeven (R), launched a national EOR initiative on July 12 at a press conference with oil industry executives, state officials, and technical experts. They said the more than 30-member group will develop recommendations for federal and state policymakers by early 2012. US Sen. Richard G. Lugar (R-Ind.) welcomed Conrad and Hoeven’s action, noting that his own energy proposal would increase US oil production by 1.8 million b/d “by enabling a truly national infrastructure to connect oil resources with the CO2 necessary to harvest [them], including from sources in Indiana, and generate substantial taxpayer returns.” The US Department of Energy has an active carbon capture and storage research program in its Fossil Fuels Office. Its web site notes that the US is the world’s EOR technology leader, using about 32 million tons/year of CO2 for this purpose. “From the perspective of the sequestration program, [EOR] represents an opportunity to sequester carbon at low net cost, due to the revenues from recovered oil and gas,” it says, adding that this application is economically limited now to CO2 emissions sources near an oil or gas reservoir. NARUC members also passed a resolution commending the Task Force on Ensuring Stable Natural Gas Markets for its report and urging state regulators to serious consider the report’s recommendations. The Bipartisan Policy Center and American Clean Skies Foundation issued the report in March.

Aff – Solvency

There is tons of work to do because the CP is viable

Environment International 2006 ( Vol 32, Issue 1, “The United States Department of Energy's Regional Carbon Sequestration Partnerships program: A collaborative approach to carbon management” http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0160412005001248)

Although there is no universal agreement on the cause, it is generally understood that global warming is occurring, and many climate scientists believe that this is due, in part, to the buildup of carbon dioxide (CO2) in the atmosphere. This is evident from the finding presented in the National Academy of Science Report to the President on Climate Change which stated “Greenhouse gases are accumulating in Earth's atmosphere as a result of human activities, causing surface air temperatures and subsurface ocean temperatures to rise. Temperatures are, in fact, rising. The changes observed over the last several decades are likely mostly due to human activities, ”. In the United States, emissions of CO2 originate mainly from the combustion of fossil fuels for energy production, transportation, and other industrial processes. Roughly one third of U.S. anthropogenic CO2 emissions come from power plants. Reduction of CO2 emissions through sequestration of carbon either in geologic formations or in terrestrial ecosystems can be part of the solution to the problem of global warming. However, a number of steps must be accomplished before sequestration can become a reality. Cost effective capture and separation technology must be developed, tested, and demonstrated; a database of potential sequestration sites must be established; and techniques must be developed to measure, monitor, and verify the sequestered CO2.

**Carbon sequestration cannot occur until reduction of greenhouse gases**

Science DailyFeb. 18**,** 2003 (“Can Carbon Sequestration Solve Global Warming?”, <http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2003/02/030217115044.htm>, DOA: 7/23/11 PJ)

"Injecting carbon underground is a short-term solution," Lackner said. "The oil industry has done this with 20 million tons a year in West Texas, but that is not the scale we're talking about here. We need to find a way to put away 20 billion tons." The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change has estimated that worldwide carbon dioxide emissions could more than triple over the next 100 years, from 7.4 billion tons of carbon per year in 1997 to approximately 20 billion tons per year by 2100. Lackner argued that large-scale carbon sequestration would allow the continued use of carbon-based fuels during the time needed to develop alternative sources of energy. Encouraged by preliminary reports indicating the feasibility of carbon sequestration in coal seams and deep saline reservoirs, the U.S. Department of Energy recently announced it will fund public-private ventures to explore the capture of carbon, but researchers say there are considerable barriers to be overcome before the technology can be widely implemented. Injecting carbon into coal seams, for example, would force millions of gallons of salty water to the Earth's surface, substantially greater amounts than the briny water produced during recovery of natural gas. "This is not a trivial problem," said Curt White, Carbon Sequestration Science Focus Area Leader at the National Energy Technology Laboratory, Pittsburgh, PA, who will report on new findings regarding the physical and chemical phenomena that take place when carbon dioxide is injected into coal seams, and discuss the projected storage capacity of coal seams. White will detail some of the technological obstacles to performing sequestration of carbon dioxide in deep unmineable coal beds, as well as parallel efforts to identify and recover the methane gas that is found in some of those sites. The valuable gas offers hope that the cost of capturing carbon can be covered. Water disposal is a challenge because high concentrations of salts and other dissolved solids can be toxic to some organisms, White said. "Development of technologies to properly dispose of huge amounts of produced water is a problem area that needs further research." White and his colleagues are studying surveys conducted by the U.S. Bureau of Mines to determine which coal seams in the United States might contain the most methane. The researchers are also exploring the long-term impact of pumping carbon into coal seams and brine fields. "We now have a much better understanding of what we think is going to happen," White said. "I think that with the proper research and the right resources, the problem areas can be overcome." The capture of carbon will not become routine, however, until steps are taken to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, according to Howard Herzog, principal research engineer at Massachusetts Institute of Technology Laboratory for Energy and the Environment. "Unless the economic incentives are in place, the technology is not going to go anywhere," said Herzog, who studies the economics of carbon sequestration. "Right now, the price of emitting carbons is almost free. If it goes up to about $100 per ton of carbon produced, you'd begin to see some significant scale of capture and storage."

Aff – Solvency

Sequestration creates dead zones in the ground that just leak more C02

Shaffer 2010 (Gary, professor for the Danish Centre for Earth System Science

Professor Gary Shaffer from the Danish Centre for Earth System Science examined a range of CCS methods to determine their effectiveness and long-term impacts. Reporting in the journal Nature Geoscience, Professor Shaffer says there are still questions over which sequestration process is best and which is least likely to leak carbon. “CCS has many potential advantages over other forms of climate geoengineering,” he said. “However, potential short and long-term problems with leakage from underground storage should not be taken lightly.” The study reveals leakage of sequestered CO2 could cause large scale atmospheric warming, sea level rise and oxygen depletion, acidification and elevated CO2 concentrations in the ocean. Professor Shaffer says storing CO2 in the deep ocean is a bad idea because of the problems it creates for deep sea life by creating a “large dead zone”. He says deep ocean stored CO2 would return to the atmosphere relatively quickly. Geological storage of CO2 – either underground or below the ocean floor – may be more effective, but only if leakage can be kept down to 1 per cent or less per 1,000 years. Professor Shaffer says any long term leakage would need to be actively countered by re-sequestration, which would need to be carried out over many thousands of years.

Aff – Miscalc Turn

Plan raises alert status

Beach – Master General of the Ordnance, the British Army Board – ‘2 Hugh, Implementation of No First Use of Nuclear Weapons Strategy/Agreements **from** Pugwash Meeting no. 279 "No First Use of Nuclear Weapons" London, UK, 15-17 November 2002, <http://www.pugwash.org/reports/nw/hughbeach.htm>

The other obvious way of setting oneself up for a NFU policy would be to adjust the status of one’s nuclear forces into a survivable second-strike mode. This might well involve increasing their numbers. It is no surprise that the nuclear weapons states at present professing a NFU policy are those that are actively increasing the size of their nuclear forces. American intelligence believes that the Chinese force of some 20 intercontinental missiles is to be tripled over the next decade or so. China will no doubt claim that this is being done in response to the American development of anti-ballistic missile defences. More probably China, despite the priority given to economic development, would have gone ahead with this expansion anyway. India also has plans to increase her nuclear missile force, perhaps putting them in submarines, a wholly logical implementation of a second-strike posture. Other possible responses are to disperse the missile sites, to go for mobile missiles or provide anti-ballistic missiles to defend them. (The ABM Treaty – now defunct – allowed for this. The US briefly possessed such a system and Russia still does). Another likely corollary of adopting a survivable second-strike posture would be to raise the alert status of nuclear forces. If the assumption is that these forces will be used at the time and place of a country’s own choosing then in normal circumstances a relatively relaxed posture can be adopted and the notice to fire reduced in a measured manner, when needed. If, on the other hand, nuclear weapons can be used only in retaliation for a nuclear strike on oneself then this is to give control of the timetable to the enemy. In logic a much shorter period of notice would have to be routinely observed and possibly authority to fire in the last resort permanently decentralised to individual missile force commanders. Worse still, such a country might feel compelled to adopt a policy of ‘launch on warning’ - the most unstable posture of all.

Nuclear war

Blair, President of the World Security Institute, ‘9 (Bruce, February, “Toward True Security” [www.ucsusa.org/global\_security/nuclear\_weapons/truesecurity.html](http://www.ucsusa.org/global_security/nuclear_weapons/truesecurity.html))

The U.S. policy of maintaining the ability to launch its nuclear forces on warning is inherently dangerous because it also gives the United States the ability to launch its weapons quickly and without warning. Not only could this posture result in a mistaken U.S. launch, but—given the high accuracy and large number of deployed U.S. nuclear weapons—it also gives Russia an incentive to keep its forces on hair-trigger alert to protect its vulnerable nuclear missiles from a surprise U.S. attack. This, in turn, increases the very real risk of a mistaken, unauthorized, or accidental launch of Russian missiles. This is not just a hypothetical problem. In 1995, Russia’s early-warning system indicated a possible U.S. missile attack. Russia’s radars apparently could not rule out the possibility that a nearby rocket launch was a U.S. nuclear-armed missile fired from a submarine in the Norwegian Sea. This triggered Russia’s emergency nuclear decision process, and the alarm traveled all the way up the chain of command to President Boris Yeltsin, activating his nuclear suitcase, which would be used to authorize nuclear retaliation. About eight minutes into the rocket launch, the operators of Russia’s warning radars reported that the rocket did not threaten Russia, and the alarm was canceled.

Aff – Conventional Weps Turn

NFU key to conventional shift

Martin et al – Policy Analysis Program Officer, Stanley Foundation – ‘8 Matt, A New Look at No First Use, <http://www.stanleyfoundation.org/resources.cfm?id=334>

Conference participants noted that there is a difference between declaratory policy and war plans, and that a doctrine of NFU would not necessarily change US nuclear weapons targeting policy. However, they also noted that declaratory policy helps shape the intellectual atmosphere in which US nuclear weapons policy is made. Military planners take declaratory policy into account, and its effects trickle down into procurement decisions, alert procedures, and operational war plans. A NFU policy would send a signal to American war planners that nuclear weapons are not appropriate in almost all contingencies. This would encourage them to develop capabilities and plans for using conventional arms to destroy hardened and deeply buried targets, biological weapons laboratories, and other sites that the current administration has suggested could only be destroyed by nuclear attack. Expanding conventional capabilities in turn reduces the likelihood that the United States would feel the need to use nuclear weapons. As one conference participant noted, “If you rule out the use of nuclear force, you push war planners to think with more discipline …You can’t just let military planners assume that it’s all right to use nuclear weapons to cover a wide range of targets.” Without the discipline imposed by a change in guidance doctrine, one participant said, military planners are prone to including nuclear options in war plans simply because they need a mission for weapons they already have.

Conventional ballistic missile deployment causes global missile and nuclear arms races and lowers the threshold for war

Andreasen Fmr. Director Defense Policy & Arms Control National Security Council ‘6 (Steve-, July/August, Arms Control Today, “Off Target? The Bush Administration's Plan to Arm Long-Range Ballistic Missiles with Conventional Warheads”, <http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2006_07-08/CoverStory?print>)

Since their initial deployment by the United States and the Soviet Union in the 1950s, land- and sea-based long-range (greater than 5,500 kilometers) ballistic missiles have been uniquely associated with nuclear weapons. Over the past 50 years, a long-range ballistic missile has never been used in combat by any of the five states that now possess them: China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Moreover, the United States has led an international campaign opposing the development, testing, and deployment of ballistic missiles by other states in every region of the globe, arguing that ballistic missiles, because of their short time to target and destructive force, provide a first-strike capability and are thus inherently destabilizing. In this context, the development, deployment, and potential use of long-range ballistic missiles as strategic conventional weapons raises a number of policy-related concerns and questions. Reciprocal Deployments Other states that now have long-range ballistic missiles, in particular Russia and China, could adopt our rationale and follow our lead. They could seek to develop the capability to strike with conventional long-range ballistic missiles their own set of “urgent targets,” adapting the notion of Prompt Global Strike to fit their own perceived national interest. Whether and how this might threaten U.S. security interests is somewhat of a question mark, although one can certainly envision scenarios where the risk of conflict involving long-range ballistic missiles would increase. New Deployments by States U.S. moves might also affect other states, which over the next decade or so may have the capability to develop, test, and deploy long-range ballistic missiles (e.g., India, Iran, North Korea, and Pakistan). They could publicly adopt our rationale for proceeding with “conventional” long-range ballistic missiles to fend off international pressure to restrict their own long-range missile programs. Yet, these missiles could and likely would, at least in the near term, serve as delivery platforms for nuclear weapons, given the challenge of developing an effective conventional capability. Thus, we could substantially undercut both our missile and nuclear nonproliferation policies by proceeding with the deployment of conventional long-range ballistic missiles. Lowering the Threshold for Use Deployment of conventional warheads on U.S. long-range ballistic missiles would be perceived by many as lowering the threshold for use of these weapons. Indeed, the public rationale for proceeding with conventional Trident missiles is to enhance the Pentagon’s ability to “pre-empt conventionally” and provide the president with an option to “respond quickly” with conventional arms.[2] Moreover, the deployment of conventional long-range ballistic missiles in Russia, China, and perhaps other states could happen soon after these states developed the necessary technology. It is difficult not to conclude that the probability of these weapons being used would increase, introducing a new and potentially destabilizing factor into the security calculations of a number of countries spread out over volatile regions of the globe.

Aff – Turn

Carbon Sequestration makes Earth Uninhabitable

Montague 2007(Peter, a co-founder and director of Environmental Research Foundation ( E.R.F.) in Annapolis, Maryland, “Carbon Sequestration”, <http://www.celsias.com/article/carbon-sequestration/>, 7/23/11, PJ)

After trillions of tons of carbon dioxide have been buried in the deep earth, if even a tiny proportion of it leaks back out into the atmosphere, the planet could heat rapidly and civilization as we know it could be disrupted. Quite plausibly the surface of the Earth could become uninhabitable for humans. Thus, one way or another, the future of humanity is at stake in the decision whether to endorse carbon sequestration or to develop the many renewable energy technologies that are available to [eliminate our dependence on carbon-based fuels.](http://www.precaution.org/lib/07/prn_ieer_roadmap.070822.htm)To one degree or another, carbon sequestration will benefit all of the industries involved, allowing them to continue business as usual, removing the need for substantial innovation, and reducing competition from renewable fuels. However, it is the coal industry that will benefit the most. One could argue that, without carbon sequestration, the coal industry itself [cannot survive](http://www.precaution.org/lib/07/prn_coal_news.070920.htm). Once large-scale carbon sequestration has begun, the coal industry will be free to unleash an enormous new enterprise turning coal into liquid fuels. The technology for coal-to-liquids, or CTL, was fully developed decades ago. CTL was devised by German chemists in the 1920s, and the Nazis could not have pursued World War II without it. Unfortunately, coal-to-liquids is an exceptionally dirty technology that produces twice as much carbon dioxide per gallon of fuel, compared to petroleum. Carbon sequestration would bury that extra carbon dioxide in the ground, thus solving the coal industry's biggest problem, making coal-to-liquids feasible, and assuring a future for the coal industry itself. The amount of carbon held in underground supplies of coal, oil and natural gas is very large. By a conservative estimate, worldwide there are 3510 billion tonnes of carbon remaining underground in coal; 230 billion tonnes of carbon in oil; and another 140 billion tonnes of carbon in natural gas (plus 250 billion tonnes in peat), for [a total of 4130 billion tonnes](http://www.precaution.org/lib/carbon_cycle.000601.pdf) (PDF) of carbon held in fossil fuels globally. If 25% of this were burned and the carbon sequestered, leakage of only 0.8% of the total per year would exceed the current annual human contribution to atmospheric carbon (eight billion tonnes). And of course the oil and coal companies plan to burn far more than 25% of what remains in the ground. Their goal is to burn 100% of it. If they managed to burn 75% of remaining fuels, then annual leakage of 0.26% of the total would exceed the current eight billion tonne annual human contribution to atmospheric carbon. This could eventually lead to runaway global warming, plausibly rendering the Earth uninhabitable for humans.

Short-Term effects undeniably harmful

**Montague 2007** (Peter, a co-founder and director of Environmental Research Foundation ( E.R.F.) in Annapolis, Maryland, “Carbon Sequestration”, <http://www.celsias.com/article/carbon-sequestration/>, 7/23/11, PJ)

The short-term secondary effects of a carbon sequestration program are also worth considering. Once large-scale carbon sequestration begins, it will be exceedingly difficult to stop. As soon as sequestration begins, the coal and oil corporations, and the environmental groups and universities advocating on their behalf, will assert that "carbon sequestration has been successfully demonstrated." Indeed, the environmental advocates are [making such claims already](http://www.precaution.org/lib/nrdc_defends_carbon_sequestration.070501.pdf) , based on a very short history of pumping small amounts of carbon dioxide into oil wells to force more oil to the surface.[2] But how can anyone "demonstrate" that leakage will never occur in the future? Such a demonstration cannot be made. Furthermore, once the U.S. government begins to repeat the environmentalists' false claim that carbon sequestration has been" successfully demonstrated," why would China not adopt it? And India, countries in Africa, the Middle East and the former Soviet Union -- why wouldn't they adopt it? If we claim a right to threaten the future of humanity, don't others have an equal right to assert such a claim? But can other countries devote the same resources we can devote to siting, engineering and geologic studies? Will they all be able to monitor for leaks far into the future, essentially forever? (For that matter, will the U.S. have that capability? Humans have no experience creating institutions with a duty of perpetual vigilance.) If the carbon-sequestration advocates can get their program started, it seems likely that Congress will declare the global warming problem" solved" and carbon sequestration will be employed until all the recoverable fossil fuels in the ground have been used up. If carbon sequestration advocates can get their program going, the U.S. will have little further incentive to invest in renewable sources of energy -- and so we stand to lose a unique opportunity to rebuild the U.S. economy on a sustainable basis and revive America's standing as an industrial leader in the world. Carbon sequestration, once it gets started, will allow 19th century energy technologies to dominate the U.S. throughout most of the 21st century. In sum, to evade liability, to relieve pressure for innovation, to stifle competition, and to make a great deal of money, the proponents of carbon sequestration are betting the future of humans on an untestable technology -- permanent underground storage -- an act of hubris unparalleled in the annals of our species.[3]

\*\*\*Heg\*\*\*

Navy Expansion CP 1NC (1/2)

Text: The United States federal government should substantially expand the size and capability of the Navy by fully funding the Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower.

Naval power solves their advantage faster and better

Ealgen and McGrath 5/16, Mackenzie Eaglen is Research Fellow for National Security in the Douglas and Sarah Allison Center for Foreign Policy Studies, a division of the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International Studies, at The Heritage Foundation. Bryan McGrath is a retired naval officer and the Director of Delex Consulting, Studies and Analysis in Vienna, Virginia. On active duty, he commanded the destroyer USS Bulkeley (DDG 84) and served as the primary author of the current maritime strategy. (5/16/11, Mackenzie, Bryan, “Thinking about A Day Without US Sea Power: Implications for US defense Policies” http://www.heritage.org/Research/Reports/2011/05/Thinking-About-a-Day-Without-Sea-Power-Implications-for-US-Defense-Policy) JH

Abstract: America is a maritime power, and a strong U.S. Navy is both in America’s long-term interest and essential to the nation’s prosperity. Yet U.S. sea power is in decline. If not reversed, this decline could pass the tipping point, leaving the country economically and strategically unable to reverse course, which would have profound economic and geopolitical consequences. Members of Congress and the Navy need to work together to develop long-range technology road maps, foster innovation, and properly fund and manage shipbuilding to ensure that the future Navy has the size and capabilities needed to protect and advance U.S. interests around the world. Not since the end of World War II has America more urgently needed honest and clear thinking about its enduring national interests and a bipartisan commitment to build up the civilian and military capabilities necessary to protect them. Yet Washington is increasingly looking inward. Policymakers spend enormous energy arguing about tactics without thinking about strategy. They react to today’s events rather than planning for the future. Without a common purpose and driven by the desire to save money, they take steps that will reduce military spending in the short term but vastly increase the danger and cost to America in the long term. The margins of U.S. military superiority are narrowing for every military service and in every domain. After the Cold War, military overmatch had seemingly become an American birthright and helped to uphold the implicit contract that most Americans have had with the all-volunteer military: that U.S. forces would never be put in a “fair fight.” This is simply no longer the case, as indicated by America’s recent experience in Iraq and Afghanistan and potential challenges from Iran and China. Before some of America’s core defense capabilities disappear without discussion or debate, Congress and the services would be wise to step back and examine the costs and benefits of these long-held capabilities, many of which are fundamental to U.S. military primacy. Understanding a world without these U.S. advantages will highlight their essential role both in creating and maintaining the economic and geopolitical position that America enjoys today and in fostering U.S. prosperity in the future. Congress should use this thought exercise to inform its oversight of the services and to restore the legislative branch’s legitimate role in policymaking. Providing Security That Protects and Bolsters the U.S. Economy Modern American sea power—represented for the purposes of this paper by the U.S. Navy and its expeditionary land force, the U.S. Marine Corps—is the most flexible, adaptable, useful, and powerful naval force the world has ever known. The ascendance of American sea power since the fall of the Soviet Union has been so benign and complete that many nations have forgone traditional investments in their own naval forces,[1] confident in the peace and stability provided by the United States or convinced of the futility of trying to challenge so powerful a force head-on: [T]he strong tendency toward counterhegemonic balancing in the European system during the last five centuries has not been replicated in the global maritime system. High concentrations of naval power (and in the economic correlates of naval power) tend to generate alliances with the leading power rather than against it. The decision of many of the strongest powers in the contemporary system to ally with the United States rather than against it in the Cold War and post–Cold War periods is fully consistent with behavior in the global system for the last five centuries.[2] The overwhelming majority of world commerce moves virtually unmolested across the great expanse of the maritime commons. This is as near a “given” on the international scene as can be conjured. So engrained is this sense of security in the free flow of goods across the world’s oceans that the activities of a relatively insignificant group of brigands off the East African coast have caught the world’s attention, forcing many to consider for the first time the impact of sea power on their lives. American sea power is taken for granted. Policymakers in the United States, friendly and allied governments, executive officers of international conglomerates, and would-be competitors are all affected by the daily operations of the world’s most pervasive and successful naval power, but few ever consider what the world would be like without it. Exploring this question is the central aim of this paper. The U.S. Air Force recently considered the operational implications of a “Day Without Space.” The exercise vividly demonstrated the U.S. military’s dependence on the communications and surveillance infrastructure provided by the nation’s satellites. Out of operational necessity, forces turned to backup networks, some of which current operators had long since forgotten how to operate nimbly. This eye-opening exercise has caused military planners to think more profoundly about air operations in a space-denied environment. However, as difficult as such operations may have been, backups were available. These backups may have become technologically outmoded and may be less secure from enemy intrusion, and their operators may need to call upon skills long since atrophied, but in the end, the backups existed. Implications of the Loss of Preponderant Sea Power Poverty, econ, deterrence How the United States might replace its preponderant sea power—if that day ever comes—seems less straightforward. Indeed, the question seems almost ludicrous. The United States is a maritime nation, bordered by two oceans and for much of its history protected by them. Over the past 60 years, the oceans have been highways for worldwide trade that has helped to lift more than a billion people out of poverty,[3] and those sea lanes have been patrolled by the U.S. Navy, the world’s preeminent naval power. The U.S. Navy’s global presence has added immeasurably to U.S. economic vitality and to the economies of America’s friends and allies, not to mention those of its enemies. World wars, which

Navy Expansion CP 1NC (2/2)

destroyed Europe and much of East Asia, have become almost incomprehensible thanks to the “nuclear taboo” and preponderant American sea power. If these conditions are removed, all bets are off. For more than five centuries, the global system of trade and economic development has grown and prospered in the presence of some dominant naval power. Portugal, Spain, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, and now the U.S. have each taken a turn as the major provider of naval power to maintain the global system. Each benefited handsomely from the investment: [These navies], in times of peace, secured the global commons and ensured freedom of movement of goods and people across the globe. They supported global trading systems from the age of mercantilism to the industrial revolution and into the modern era of capitalism. They were a gold standard for international exchange. These forces supported national governments that had specific global agendas for liberal trade, the rule of law at sea, and the protection of maritime commerce from illicit activities such as piracy and smuggling.[4**]** A preponderant naval power occupies a unique position in the global order, a special seat at the table, which when unoccupied creates conditions for instability. Both world wars, several European-wide conflicts, and innumerable regional fights have been fueled by naval arms races, inflamed by the combination of passionate rising powers and feckless declining powers. This thought experiment cannot go so far as to conjure “a day without the U.S. Navy,” because it strains credulity to believe the nation would ever do without one. Yet for much of its history, the country had little more than a coastal defense force. In other periods, America has maintained small, far-flung cruising squadrons that in no way compare to the combat power arrayed continuously in the Middle East and the Western Pacific for the past two decades. The relevant question is: “What would a day without preponderant American sea power be like?” Building the current level of American sea power has taken enormous resources and many decades,[5] and the size of the fleet is not likely to be dramatically reduced in the near term. More likely, incremental cuts based on faulty premises and a lack of strategic direction will, over time, diminish American sea power as the country’s vision of itself becomes more modest and its sense of destiny and centrality is reduced. While ill-considered procurement reductions will slowly reduce the number of ships and aircraft in the Navy, financial decisions could also erode the Navy’s ability to deploy credible and relevant forces persistently, regardless of how many ships the Navy may have. Today’s Navy is experiencing extreme levels of stress. [6] While the fleet has shrunk by about 15 percent since 1998,[7] the number of ships deployed overseas has remained constant at about 100. Each ship goes to sea longer and more often, resulting in problems such as the well-publicized shortfalls in surface ship condition.[8] With no surge capacity left in the fleet, each new casualty ripples through the schedules of dozens of ships. With the end of supplemental funding, Navy maintenance funding will be cut by almost 20 percent this year. In this context, a relatively small additional reduction in maintenance funding could render a Navy with 250–280 ships capable of keeping only 50 to 60 ships at sea. Even if the Navy can sustain today’s number of ships or even grow slightly over the next decade as predicted by current Navy shipbuilding plans, the fleet will increasingly be composed of smaller and less capable littoral combat ships and logistics ships, such as Joint High Speed Vessels. This trend toward a fleet for engagement and maritime security could be enabled by the country’s increasingly modest vision of itself and the erosion of its sense of destiny and centrality. With ship design times of 20 years or longer and service lives of up to 50 years, the fleet could degrade to a point at which the country will be economically and strategically unable to reverse course. The nation and the most versatile element of its military power would then continue to decline to second-rate status. An absolute decline in American sea power would probably span decades, but the examples of the Soviet Union and previous naval powers unable to deploy and maintain a robust fleet demonstrate how rapidly a navy can become hollow and unable to influence events abroad.

Navy Expansion CP – China Solvency

The space race is a rouse – China is going to attack with their navy

O’Rourke 6/8**,** Specialist in Naval Affairs, Congressional Research Service (6/8/11, Ronald, “China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities – Background and Issues for Congress” www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33153.pdf\_)

Admiral Michael Mullen, the Chairman ofthe Joints Chiefs of`StafI stated in June 2010 that "l have moved from being curious to being genuinely concemed" about China's military progams. The question of how the United States should respond to China's military modemization effort is of particular importance to the U.S. Navy, because many U.S. military programs for countering improved Chinese military forces would fall within the Navy's budget. Decisions that Congress and the executive branch make regarding U.S. Navy programs for countering improved Chinese maritime military capabilities could affect the likelihood or possible outcome of a potential U.S.-Chinese military conflict in the Pacific over Taiwan or some other issue. Some observers consider such a conflict to be very unlikely, in part because of significant U.S.-Chinese economic linkages and the tremendous damage that such a conflict could cause on both sides. ln the absence of such a conflict, however, the U.S.-Chinese military balance in the Pacific could nevertheless influence day-to-day choices made by other Pacific countries, including choices on whether to align their policies more closely with China or the United States. In this sense, decisions tl1at Congress and the executive branch make regarding U.S. Navy programs fm' countering improved Chinae maritime milita.ry forces could influence the political evolution of the Pacific, which in turn could affect the ability of the United States to pursue goals relating to various policy issues, both in the Pacific and elsewhere China's naval modemization effort, which began in the l990s, encompasses a broad army of weapon acquisition progams, including anti-ship ballistic missiles (ASBMs), submarines, and surliiee ships. China's naval modernization effort also includes refomis and inlprovements in n"˜u|intena|'k:e and logistics, naval doctrine, personnel quality, education, training, and exercises. Observers believe that the near-term focus of China's military modernization effect has been to develop military options for addressing the situation with Taiwan. Consistent with this goaL observers believe that China wants its military to be capable of acting as a so-called anti-access force-a force that can deter U.S. intervention in a conflict involving Taiwan, or failing that, delay the arrival can reduce the effectiveness of intervening U.S. naval and air forces. Observers believe that China's miIita.ry modernization effort, including its naval modernization effort, is increasingly oriented toward pursuing additional goals, such as asserting or defending China's territmial claims in the South China Sea and East China S ; e|1forcing China's view@a minority view among world nations-tlmt it luis the right to regulate fmeign military activities in its 200mile maritime exclusive economic zone (EEZ); protecting China's sm lines of communications; protecting and evacuating Chinese nationals living and working in foreign countries; displacing U.S. influence in the Pacific; and asserting China's status as a major world power.

China maritime power supremacy causes China-Taiwan war – turns the case

Holmes 6/27, (6/27/11, James, Foreign Policy, “Blue Water Dreams” http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/06/27/blue\_water\_dreams?page=0,1&hidecomments=yes) AT

Furthermore, Chinese observers have looked around the U.N. Security Council and noticed that all five permanent members except China deploy aircraft carriers. Closer to home, the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force operates light carriers known euphemistically as "helicopter destroyers"; South Korea has a similar vessel. Even Thailand has a flattop. The upshot is that a carrier will certify China's arrival as a sea power. But there's more to China's navy than nationalism -- and there's more to the Chinese aircraft-carrier program than salvaging China's good name or keeping up with the Joneses. Beijing can use carrier task forces to uphold real, tangible interests. Most obviously, a PLA Navy carrier group could exit from the China seas through the Ryukyus, to Taiwan's north, or the Luzon Strait, to the island's south, during times of strife. By threatening the east coast of Taiwan, carrier groups would further complicate a tactical picture for the island's defenders that already verges on hopeless. The PLA already holds a commanding margin of superiority, so carrier operations would not decide a cross-strait war. But compelling the Taiwan Navy and Air Force to look eastward -- as well as westward and skyward -- would further disorient them, letting the PLA set the terms of engagement. PLA forces could thus prevail before the U.S. military could intervene, and Beijing would fulfill its dream of national unification with minimal disturbance to the regional order.

Navy Expansion CP – Heg NB

The CP solves every scenario for war

Ealgen and McGrath 5/16, Mackenzie Eaglen is Research Fellow for National Security in the Douglas and Sarah Allison Center for Foreign Policy Studies, a division of the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International Studies, at The Heritage Foundation. Bryan McGrath is a retired naval officer and the Director of Delex Consulting, Studies and Analysis in Vienna, Virginia. On active duty, he commanded the destroyer USS Bulkeley (DDG 84) and served as the primary author of the current maritime strategy. (5/16/11, Mackenzie, Bryan, “Thinking about A Day Without US Sea Power: Implications for US defense Policies” http://www.heritage.org/Research/Reports/2011/05/Thinking-About-a-Day-Without-Sea-Power-Implications-for-US-Defense-Policy) MG

The idea of a world without the benefit of preponderant American seapower may sound alarmist and farfetched. Unfortunately, those who follow military cutbacks and world affairs know that it isn’t. Indeed, the following scenario is all too plausible. .  .  . In 2020, several major European nations default on their debt. Contagion in the financial markets plunges the world economy into global depression. From 2020 to 2025, the U.S. economy contracts from $20 trillion to $12 trillion. During this time, two successive U.S. presidents seek and obtain deep cuts in the size of the U.S. armed forces. Homeland security becomes the main focus of the Department of Defense, with policy-makers concentrating on port and border security, land-based strategic nuclear forces, antiterrorism, and managing civil unrest. The global implications of this retrenchment are stark. China’s claims on the South China Sea—previously disputed by virtually all nations in the region and routinely contested by U.S. and partner naval forces—are accepted as a fait accompli, effectively putting the entire expanse under Chinese hegemony. Korea, unified in 2017 after the implosion of the North, signs a mutual defense treaty with China. Japan is increasingly isolated and executes long-rumored plans to create a nuclear weapons capability. India, recognizing that its previous role as a balancer to China has lost relevance with the pullback of the Americans, agrees to supplement Chinese naval power in the Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf to protect the flow of oil to Southeast Asia. China agrees to exercise increased influence over Pakistan. Iran dominates the Persian Gulf and is a nuclear power. Its navy aggressively patrols the Gulf while the Revolutionary Guard Navy harasses shipping and oil infrastructure to force the Gulf Cooperation Council countries into Tehran’s orbit. Russia supplies Iran with a steady flow of military technology and nuclear industry expertise. In Egypt, a decade-long experiment in participatory democracy ends with a violent seizure of power by Islamists. The United States is identified closely with the previous coalition government, and riots break out outside the U.S. embassy. Americans in Egypt hunker down and hope for the best, as there are no U.S. forces in the Mediterranean to evacuate them. The NATO alliance falls apart. For its energy security, Europe depends on Russia and Iran, which control the main supply lines and sources of oil and gas to Western Europe. Major European nations stand down their militaries and make only limited contributions to a new EU constabulary force. No European nation maintains the ability to conduct significant out-of-area operations, and Europe as a whole maintains little airlift capacity. The impact of the world fiscal and political crisis is devastating to the U.S. Navy, which has been in decline since the latter part of the Obama administration, when Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta chose to maintain proportional resourcing of the Navy, Air Force, and Army rather than make difficult choices among competing priorities. World trade goes into steep decline. In addition, shippers avoid U.S. ports as a result of the onerous container inspection regime. As a result, American consumers face a diminished selection of goods and a lower standard of living.

Navy Expansion CP – Solvency Ext

Now is key time to act – we’re losing our competitive edge

Ealgen and McGrath 5/16, Mackenzie Eaglen is Research Fellow for National Security in the Douglas and Sarah Allison Center for Foreign Policy Studies, a division of the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International Studies, at The Heritage Foundation. Bryan McGrath is a retired naval officer and the Director of Delex Consulting, Studies and Analysis in Vienna, Virginia. On active duty, he commanded the destroyer USS Bulkeley (DDG 84) and served as the primary author of the current maritime strategy. (5/16/11, Mackenzie, Bryan, “Thinking about A Day Without US Sea Power: Implications for US defense Policies” http://www.heritage.org/Research/Reports/2011/05/Thinking-About-a-Day-Without-Sea-Power-Implications-for-US-Defense-Policy) MG

Developing a long-term research and development plan. After numerous studies and a half-dozen shipbuilding plans, Navy leaders have correctly concluded that the United States needs a larger fleet—not simply in numbers of ships and aircraft, but also in terms of increased network capability, longer range, and increased persistence. Navy leaders recognize that the United States is quickly losing its monopolies on guided weapons and the ability to project power. Precision munitions (guided rockets, artillery, mortars, and missiles) and battle networks are proliferating, while advances in radar and electro-optical technology are increasingly rendering stealth capabilities less effective. Congress should demand long-range technology road maps, including a science and technology plan and a research and development plan for the U.S. Navy. These plans should broadly outline future investments, capabilities, and requirements. Getting the fleet size right. Congress should direct the Navy to provide a “resource unconstrained” fleet composition appropriate to meeting the requirements of A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower, the Navy’s 2007 maritime strategy. The study should include an analysis of the capabilities and missions called for in the strategy and identify which are at risk, given current and planned fleet size and resources. This study should include options for additional forward stationing of U.S. Navy vessels and proposals for new classes of ships designed specifically for low-end naval presence missions. Without this type of strategy-driven analysis by Navy leaders, Congress will continue to struggle to determine where to apply diminishing resources within the defense budget and how to justify the additional investments needed in higher-priority areas. America is a maritime nation, and our Navy is the most visible and effective symbol of our national power and strength overseas. Washington decision-makers should recognize the impact and influence of forces that are as useful in peacetime in deterring conflict as they are in wartime while pursuing it. And they need to recognize it before it’s too late.

**US navy power in decline – we must reverse course to keep heg**

Eaglen and McGrath 5/16/11 (specalist on defense strategy at the heritage foundation, “Thinking About a Day Without Sea Power: Implications for U.S. Defense Policy” <http://www.heritage.org/Research/Reports/2011/05/Thinking-About-a-Day-Without-Sea-Power-Implications-for-US-Defense-Policy>)

America is a maritime power, and a strong U.S. Navy is both in America’s long-term interest and essential to the nation’s prosperity. Yet U.S. sea power is in decline. If not reversed, this decline could pass the tipping point, leaving the country economically and strategically unable to reverse course, which would have profound economic and geopolitical consequences. Members of Congress and the Navy need to work together to develop long-range technology road maps, foster innovation, and properly fund and manage shipbuilding to ensure that the future Navy has the size and capabilities needed to protect and advance U.S. interests around the world.

Navy Expansion CP – More Important than Space

We are more dependent on our navy than we are on space

Eaglen and McGrath 5/16/11 (specalist on defense strategy at the heritage foundation, “Thinking About a Day Without Sea Power: Implications for U.S. Defense Policy” <http://www.heritage.org/Research/Reports/2011/05/Thinking-About-a-Day-Without-Sea-Power-Implications-for-US-Defense-Policy>)

The U.S. Air Force recently considered the operational implications of a “Day Without Space.” The exercise vividly demonstrated the U.S. military’s dependence on the communications and surveillance infrastructure provided by the nation’s satellites. Out of operational necessity, forces turned to backup networks, some of which current operators had long since forgotten how to operate nimbly. This eye-opening exercise has caused military planners to think more profoundly about air operations in a space-denied environment. However, as difficult as such operations may have been, backups were available. These backups may have become technologically outmoded and may be less secure from enemy intrusion, and their operators may need to call upon skills long since atrophied, but in the end, the backups existed. How the United States might replace its preponderant sea power—if that day ever comes—seems less straightforward. Indeed, the question seems almost ludicrous. The United States is a maritime nation, bordered by two oceans and for much of its history protected by them. Over the past 60 years, the oceans have been highways for worldwide trade that has helped to lift more than a billion people out of poverty, and those sea lanes have been patrolled by the U.S. Navy, the world’s preeminent naval power. The U.S. Navy’s global presence has added immeasurably to U.S. economic vitality and to the economies of America’s friends and allies, not to mention those of its enemies. World wars, which destroyed Europe and much of East Asia, have become almost incomprehensible thanks to the “nuclear taboo” and preponderant American sea power. If these conditions are removed, all bets are off.

Navy Expansion CP – Navy Heg Good (Laundry List)

Naval flexibility will be key to prevent terrorism, ethnic conflicts, cyclones, floods, Indian-Chinese rivalry and more.

Kaplan 09 (Robert, Robert D. Kaplan, a National Correspondent for The Atlantic and a Senior Fellow at the Center for a New American Security, in Washington, D.C., is writing a book on the Indian Ocean. He recently was the Class of 1960 Distinguished Visiting Professor in National Security at the U.S. Naval Academy. March 16, 2009 Center Stage for the 21st Century: Rivalry in the Indian Ocean “Real Clear Politics”

http://www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2009/03/rivalry\_in\_the\_indian\_ocean.html)

Packed with states with weak governments and tottering infrastructure, the shores of the Indian Ocean make it necessary for the United States and other countries to transform their militaries. This area represents an unconventional world, a world in which the U.S. military, for one, will have to respond, expeditionary style, to a range of crises: not just piracy but also terrorist attacks, ethnic conflicts, cyclones, and floods. For even as the United States' armed forces, and particularly its navy, are in relative decline, they remain the most powerful conventional military on earth, and they will be expected to lead such emergency responses. With population growth in climatically and seismically fragile zones today placing more human beings in danger's way than at almost any other time in history, one deployment will quickly follow another. It is the variety and recurrence of these challenges that make the map of the Indian Ocean in the twenty-first century vastly different from the map of the North Atlantic in the twentieth century. The latter illustrated both a singular threat and a singular concept: the Soviet Union. And it gave the United States a simple focus: to defend Western Europe against the Red Army and keep the Soviet navy bottled up near the polar icecap. Because the threat was straightforward, and the United States' power was paramount, the U.S.-led North Atlantic Treaty Organization arguably became history's most successful alliance. One might envision a "NATO of the seas" for the Indian Ocean, composed of South Africa, Oman, Pakistan, India, Singapore, and Australia, with Pakistan and India bickering inside the alliance much as Greece and Turkey have inside NATO. But that idea fails to capture what the Indian Ocean is all about. Owing to the peripatetic movements of medieval Arab and Persian sailors and the legacies of Portuguese, Dutch, and British imperialists, the Indian Ocean forms a historical and cultural unit. Yet in strategic terms, it, like the world at large today, has no single focal point. The Gulf of Aden, the Persian Gulf, the Bay of Bengal -- all these areas are burdened by different threats with different players. Just as today NATO is a looser alliance, less singularly focused than it was during the Cold War, any coalition centered on the Indian Ocean should be adapted to the times. Given the ocean's size -- it stretches across seven time zones and almost half of the world's latitudes -- and the comparative slowness at which ships move, it would be a challenge for any one multinational navy to get to a crisis zone in time. The United States was able to lead the relief effort off the coast of Indonesia after the 2004 tsunami only because the carrier strike group the USS Abraham Lincoln happened to be in the vicinity and not in the Korean Peninsula, where it was headed. A better approach would be to rely on multiple regional and ideological alliances in different parts of the Indian Ocean. Some such efforts have already begun. The navies of Thailand, Singapore, and Indonesia have banded together to deter piracy in the Strait of Malacca; those of the United States, India, Singapore, and Australia have exercised together off India's southwestern coast -- an implicit rebuke to China's designs in the region. According to Vice Admiral John Morgan, former deputy chief of U.S. naval operations, the Indian Ocean strategic system should be like the New York City taxi system: driven by market forces and with no central dispatcher. Coalitions will naturally form in areas where shipping lanes need to be protected, much as taxis gather in the theater district before and after performances. For one Australian commodore, the model should be a network of artificial sea bases supplied by the U.S. Navy, which would allow for different permutations of alliances: frigates and destroyers from various states could "plug and play" into these sea bases as necessary and spread out from East Africa to the Indonesian archipelago. Like a microcosm of the world at large, the greater Indian Ocean region is developing into an area of both ferociously guarded sovereignty (with fast-growing economies and militaries) and astonishing interdependence (with its pipelines and land and sea routes). And for the first time since the Portuguese onslaught in the region in the early sixteenth century, the West's power there is in decline, however subtly and relatively. The Indians and the Chinese will enter into a dynamic great-power rivalry in these waters, with their shared economic interests as major trading partners locking them in an uncomfortable embrace. The United States, meanwhile, will serve as a stabilizing power in this newly complex area. Indispensability, rather than dominance, must be its goal.

Aff – Links to Politics

The counter-plan would face widespread domestic opposition

Preble93– (Christopher A., director of foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute, 8-2-1993, The Cold War Navy in the Post War World, http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa-195.html)

Without a reassessment of the national strategy that governs the use of naval assets--including de-emphasizing the importance of carriers--we are unlikely to see the types of reductions contemplated in Aspin's proposal, much less deeper cuts. The authors of ". . . From the Sea" simply refused to confront the crucial issue of carriers. The aircraft carrier, central to the Maritime Strategy's emphasis on confronting a huge Soviet fleet in the open ocean, should no longer be regarded as the central element of U.S. naval strategy. Moreover, parochial political factors are undermining attempts to implement reductions in force that are anything more than marginal. Domestic political pressures may, in fact, force the continued construction of some new ships and aircraft deemed no longer essential even by members of the defense establishment.(6) For now, the construction of the USS John Stennis (CVN-74) and the USS United States (CVN-75) is funded through FY96 at a tremendous cost to taxpayers. In FY93 the Navy allocated $832 million to the purchase of long- lead-time materials for CVN-76.(7) That represents a mere fraction of the total cost of such a vessel, estimated at over $10 billion. Those construction programs were initiated during the Cold War and justified by the Maritime Strategy. With the end of the Cold War, and within the framework of a new strategy, they are no longer needed.

Aff – NB NUQ

**Our naval hegemony is not headed towards a decline. Comparisons to the UK pre WWI are false.**

Farley 07 (Robert is an assistant professor at the Patterson School of Diplomacy and International Commerce, University of Kentucky. He contributes to the blogs Lawyers, Guns, and Money and TAPPED, October 23, 2007, The False Decline of the U.S. Navy <http://prospect.org/cs/articles?article=the_false_decline_of_the_us_navy>

We live in strange times. While the United States is responsible for close to 50 percent of aggregate world military expenditure, and maintains close alliances with almost all of the other major military powers, a community of defense analysts continues to insist that we need to spend more. In the November issue of The Atlantic, Robert Kaplan asserts that United States hegemony is under the threat of “elegant decline,” and points to what conventional analysts might suggest is the most secure element of American power; the United States Navy. Despite the fact that the U.S. Navy remains several orders of magnitude more powerful than its nearest rival, Kaplan says that we must beware; if we allow the size of our Navy to further decline, we risk repeating the experience of the United Kingdom in the years before World War I. Unfortunately, since no actual evidence of U.S. naval decline exists, Kaplan is forced to rely on obfuscation, distortion, and tendentious historical analogies to make his case. The centerpiece of Kaplan’s argument is a comparison of the current U.S. Navy to the British Royal Navy at the end of the 19th century. The decline of the Royal Navy heralded the collapse of British hegemony, and the decline of the U.S. Navy threatens a similar fate for the United States. The only problem with this argument is that similarities between the 21st century United States and the 19th century United Kingdom are more imagined than real. It’s true that the relative strength of the Royal Navy declined at the end of the 19th century, but this was due entirely the rise of the United States and Germany. But the absolute strength of the Royal Navy increased in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, as the United Kingdom strove to maintain naval dominance over two countries that possessed larger economies and larger industrial bases than that of Great Britain. In other words, the position of the Royal Navy declined because the position of the United Kingdom declined; in spite of this decline, the Royal Navy continued to dominate the seas against all comers until 1941. Britain’s relative economic decline preceded its naval decline, although the efforts to keep up with Germany, the United States, and later Japan did serious damage to the British economy. The United States faces a situation which is in no way similar.

**United States naval capabilities are rivaled by no one. We will not be challenged for 50 years**

Farley 07 (Robert is an assistant professor at the Patterson School of Diplomacy and International Commerce, University of Kentucky. He contributes to the blogs Lawyers, Guns, and Money and TAPPED, October 23, 2007, The False Decline of the U.S. Navy <http://prospect.org/cs/articles?article=the_false_decline_of_the_us_navy>

The United States Navy currently operates eleven aircraft carriers. The oldest and least capable is faster, one third larger, and carries three times the aircraft of Admiral Kuznetsov, the largest carrier in the Russian Navy. Unlike China’s only aircraft carrier, the former Russian Varyag, American carriers have engines and are capable of self-propulsion. The only carrier in Indian service is fifty years old and a quarter the size of its American counterparts. No navy besides the United States’ has more than one aircraft carrier capable of flying modern fixed wing aircraft. The United States enjoys similar dominance in surface combat vessels and submarines, operating twenty-two cruisers, fifty destroyers, fifty-five nuclear attack submarines, and ten amphibious assault ships (vessels roughly equivalent to most foreign aircraft carriers). In every category the U.S. Navy combines presumptive numerical superiority with a significant ship-to-ship advantage over any foreign navy. This situation is unlikely to change anytime soon. The French Navy and the Royal Navy will each expand to two aircraft carriers over the next decade. The most ambitious plans ascribed to the People’s Liberation Army Navy call for no more than three aircraft carriers by 2020, and even that strains credulity, given China’s inexperience with carrier operations and the construction of large military vessels. While a crash construction program might conceivably give the Chinese the ability to achieve local dominance (at great cost and for a short time), the United States Navy will continue to dominate the world’s oceans and littorals for at least the next fifty years.

Aff – NB NUQ

Our decline in ship numbers has been checked by increased technological capabilities. It DOES NOT mean we should increase numbers

Farley 07 (Robert is an assistant professor at the Patterson School of Diplomacy and International Commerce, University of Kentucky. He contributes to the blogs Lawyers, Guns, and Money and TAPPED, October 23, 2007, The False Decline of the U.S. Navy <http://prospect.org/cs/articles?article=the_false_decline_of_the_us_navy>

It’s true that a 600 ship navy can do more than the current 250-plus ship force of the current U.S. Navy, but Kaplan’s playing a game of bait and switch. The Navy has fewer ships than it did two decades ago, but the ships it has are far more capable than those of the 1980s. Because of the collapse of its competitors, the Navy is relatively more capable of fighting and winning wars now than it was during the Reagan administration. Broadly speaking, navies have two missions; warfighting, and maritime maintenance. Kaplan wants to confuse the maritime maintenance mission (which can be done in collaboration with others) with the warfighting mission (which need not be). A navy can require the cooperation of others for the maintenance mission, while still possessing utter military superiority over any one navy or any plausible combination of navies on the high seas. Indeed, this is the situation that the United States Navy currently enjoys. It cannot be everywhere all at once, and does require the cooperation of regional navies for fighting piracy and smuggling. At the same time, the U.S. Navy can destroy any (and probably all, at the same time) naval challengers. To conflate these two missions is equal parts silly and dishonest.

Aff – Space Heg First

Space Heg is key to all other aspects of our Heg

Dowd 09 August 3, 2009 policy review » no. 156 » features

Surrendering Outer Space by Alan W. Dowd a senior fellow with the Fraser Institute America yields the high ground <http://www.hoover.org/publications/policy-review/article/5421>

Surrendering the ability to carry astronauts into space promises to be a blow to America’s international stature. And in this age of global connectivity and global competition, what may seem like a marginal matter could become a serious problem. We already live at a time America is perceived as a nation in decline. Pierre Hassner of the Paris-based National Foundation for Political Science recently concluded, “It will not be the New American Century.” A 2005 piece in the Guardian dismissed America as “the hollow superpower.” It’s no wonder that Obama addressed the “nagging fear” of America’s decline in his inauguration speech, and Bush dismissed “the belief that America is in decline” in his 2006 State of the Union address. What’s relevant here is how America’s self-imposed absence from space could fuel the declinist fire, weaken America’s standing, and enhance the position of America’s enemies. Again, history is instructive: When Sputnik rocketed into orbit and Moscow triumphed, Senator Henry Jackson called it “a national week of shame and danger.” America’s attempt to match Moscow only highlighted the gap between the two superpowers when, weeks after Sputnik, America’s answer, Vanguard, exploded on takeoff. Leebaert writes that Moscow’s initial space superiority was “alarming because it was far more visible than anything else in science and technology.” Combined with America’s futility, the situation negatively impacted the country’s prestige and security, “the two in those days being habitually linked.”11

Aff – China Navy Bad Turn

Turn –Increase of US maritime power incentivizes China to build up naval power.

Holmes 6/27, (6/27/11, James, Foreign Policy, “Blue Water Dreams” http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/06/27/blue\_water\_dreams?page=0,1&hidecomments=yes)

Fear that the U.S. Navy will cut China's economic lifelines from afar beckons China's strategic gaze irresistibly seaward. Aneditorial in the official *People's Daily*last December captured China's broader geopolitical anxieties. The United States, the editors write, is intent on preserving "its hegemony across the world," including on the high seas in Asia. Focused on latter-day containment, Washington has stayed outside the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea. Why? Because, the editors write, it "considers exclusive economic zones to be international waters, which, by its hegemonic logic, should be included in the U.S. sphere of influence." In voicing their own fears, Chinese pundits -- not unreasonably -- impute fear to the United States. "Any fast-developing country," concludes the *Daily*, will be "instinctively seen" as a challenge to U.S. primacy. Such countries must construct strong military and naval forces, equipping themselves to resist a domineering America. Such a bleak analysis would be instantly familiar to Thucydides, who found the "real cause" of the Peloponnesian War in the "growth of the power of Athens, and the alarm which this inspired in Sparta." Fear made great-power war "inevitable." From Beijing's standpoint, assenting to permanent U.S. maritime supremacy would amount to knuckling under to Thucydides's law condemning the weak to remain subservient to the strong. Dread of what U.S. leaders might do with overwhelming sea power helps account for China's quest for a great navy. But why aircraft carriers specifically? Beijing is already fielding an impressive cruise-missile navy specifically designed to deny U.S. naval forces access to Asian seas and skies during a Taiwan confrontation or some other upheaval. Cruise missiles, augmented by submarines, ballistic missiles, and land-based tactical aircraft, would be far more lethal against the U.S. Navy than any carrier fleet Beijing will put to sea anytime soon. Writing in *International Security*, Boston College professor Robert Ross ascribes China's carrier-centric naval buildup to "naval nationalism." In this view, high-end warships represent tokens of great power that Beijing simply must have to fulfill its destiny as a seafaring state. Such talismans fire popular enthusiasm for nautical endeavors, and for the state that undertakes them. History is not unimportant here. China still nurses memories of its long "century of humiliation" at the hands of seaborne conquerors like imperial Britain, France, Germany, and Japan. Starting with the First Opium War (1839-1842), imperial powers defeated the ruling Qing dynasty again and again, compelling Qing emperors to accept "unequal treaties" along with such indignities as foreign gunboats patrolling Chinese rivers. Such memories are a lot for Asia's historical central power to stomach.

Aff – China Navy Good Turn

China naval power good – peaceful transition without US-China war and vessels responding to humanitarian disasters

Holmes 6/27, (6/27/11, James, Foreign Policy, “Blue Water Dreams” http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/06/27/blue\_water\_dreams?page=0,1&hidecomments=yes) AT

There's also the South China Sea, which has dominated headlines of late. Some Chinese-claimed islets in the Spratlys and Paracels are too small to fortify; carrier groups would provide a forward, mobile airfield from which to defend the islands, the adjacent waters, and the rich natural resources thought to lie in the seabed beneath. And as Beijing turns its gaze further southwest, carriers could anchor a PLA Navy presence in South Asia, should Chinese leaders opt to create a standing Indian Ocean squadron. Flattops could perform many functions, just as these multimission platforms have spearheaded U.S. naval operations since World War II. Nor must Chinese carriers match their U.S. Navy counterparts on a ship-for-ship basis to achieve Beijing's goals. As noted before, the PLA Navy surface fleet benefits from dense land-based fire support. For instance, the PLA Second Artillery Corps, or missile force, is reportedly fielding the world's first anti-ship ballistic missile (ASBM), a truck-launched weapon capable of striking ships under way hundreds of miles from Asian shores. There is no known defense against it. If the missile lives up to its hype -- and if Beijing acquires sufficient numbers of rounds -- U.S. Pacific Fleet commanders will be increasingly reluctant to venture westward of Guam. And if they do accept the losses inflicted by ASBM strikes, U.S. mariners will encounter land-based combat aircraft, quiet diesel submarines, and stealthy high-speed catamarans toting long-range anti-ship cruise missiles. Just reaching the combat theater could come at a steep cost. If indeed the PLA converts the Western Pacific into a no-go zone for the U.S. Navy, it can uphold China's Thucydidean interests without ever risking a battle with its major antagonist. Land-based defenses may grant PLA naval commanders time to train pilots. It's a steep learning curve: In 1954 alone -- fully eight yearsafter a jet fighter first landed aboard the carrier USS Franklin D. Roosevelt, and despite having developed sound concepts for flying jet aircraft from carrier decks -- the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps lost 776 aircraft and 535 airmen. China is by no means exempt from such hazards. Shore defenses also give China's navy a respite to work the engineering kinks out of the flattops themselves and to experiment with fleet tactics. Carriers steam in company with an entourage of escorts and logistics ships. It takes time to sort through various formations, defensive screens, underway replenishment techniques, and the like. Shore fire support affords the PLA leisure to devise its own approach to carrier operations, and it spares China the need for a costly, uncertain naval arms race with the United States. Why waste scarce resources? By no means is combat readiness the sole motive propelling China's carrier ambitions. Carriers can prosecute numerous noncombat missions. After the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami, for instance, Chinese pundits took note of how U.S. Navy vessels transiting the afflicted region rushed to the scene to render assistance. Hard power, in other words, enabled the soft kind, and Beijing felt sidelined. To remedy such shortcomings, it has built vessels like hospital ships and amphibious transports suitable for responding to natural and humanitarian disasters. Big-deck carriers would make a worthy addition to China's emerging disaster-relief repertoire. And even these non-Thucydidean errands of mercy add luster to China's maritime reputation, bolstering the legitimacy of its naval enterprise and thus indirectly advancing its national interests. Great powers do well by doing good. Comforting the afflicted is not only worthwhile in its own right but helps the benefactor establish a track record for using its martial prowess wisely and humanely. Such a power eases suspicions of its intentions by furnishing international public goods that benefit not only China but its Asian neighbors. Beijing knows that to truly be a great sea power, you have to look -- and act -- the part.

\*\*\*Miscalc/China/Cred\*\*\*

NFU CP 1NC (1/2)

Text: The United States federal government should declare and adopt and Nuclear No First Use policy.

US threat of nuclear first strike in response to chemical and biological weapons simultaneously increases the risk that these weapons are accidentally launched and that the US is forces to respond with nuclear weapons. Only CP solves for miscalc and war

Sagan 00 (Scott D. Sagan, Professor of Political Science and Director of the Center for International Security and Cooperation atStanford University 2000

States threaten to use nuclear weapons in retaliation for an adversary's use of chemical or biological weapons? The U.S. government has a clear policy on this matter: it is deliberately unclear about its plans. In March 1996, Secretary of Defense William Perry explained: "For obvious reasons, we choose not to specify in detail what responses we would make to a chemical attack. However, as we stated during the Gulf War, if any country were foolish enough to use chemical weapons against the United States, the response will be 'absolutely overwhelming' and 'devastating."'" The purpose of this U.S. policy-which has become known as the "calculated ambiguity" doctrine-was underscored by Secretary of Defense William Cohen in November 1998: "We think the ambiguity involved in the issue of nuclear weapons contributes to our own security, keeping any potential adversary who might use either chemical or biological [weapons] unsure of what our response would be." The doctrine's proponents, both inside and outside the U.S. government, claim that such a threat to respond asymmetrically-retaliating with nuclear weapons in response to a chemical or biological weapons attack-is an unfortunate necessity They argue that, because the United States has foresworn the option of retaliating in kind, nuclear weapons threats are the only strong deterrent preventing so-called rogue nations from using their newly acquired chemical or biological arsenals.3 The calculated ambiguity doctrine, however, is deeply controversial because the U.S. government, and the governments of other nuclear weapons states, have made commitments, most recently before the 1995 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) extension conference, that they will neither use nor threaten to use nuclear weapons against any nonnuclear member state of the NPT.4 Efforts to back away from such promises, critics argue, undercut these global commitments, legitimize nuclear weapons threats, and encourage nonnuclear states to develop the bomb to deter their dangerous neighbors. The U.S. calculated ambiguity doctrine raises two crucial questions. Is the threat of U.S. nuclear retaliation credible and effective against states that possess chemical weapons (CW) and biological weapons (BW)? Are such U.S. nuclear threats harmful to global efforts to inhibit the proliferation of nuclear weapons? This article addresses these issues and argues that the current debate has virtually ignored what is arguably the most important question about U.S. nuclear weapons doctrine: will the U.S. government's calculated ambiguity policy increase or decrease the likelihood that nuclear weapons will be used in combat? I conclude that the current policy is misguided because it increases the likelihood that the United States will use nuclear weapons, in an inappropriate manner, in future military conflicts. The calculated ambiguity doctrine should therefore be replaced with a stronger commitment to respond to the use of chemical or biological weapons with prompt and devastating conventional retaliation.

NFU CP 1NC (2/2)

Universal NFU key to solve – only way to devalue possession of nuclear weapons

Johnson 09 09 (Rebecca Johnson, Spring 2009, disarmament diplomacy, http://www.acronym.org.uk/dd/dd90/90sa.htm issue no. 90 spring 2009 Security Assurances for Everyone: A New Approach to Deterring the Use of Nuclear Weapons)

The problem with the traditional approaches on security assurances is that they are stuck in a time warp. They still treat the five NPT-recognized NWS as both primary threat and primary source of assistance. Yet the world has moved on. There are now eight, possibly nine, states that possess nuclear weapons, and many governments - including the NWS, as illustrated in recent speeches by US President Barack Obama and UK Prime Minister Gordon Brown - take seriously the potential threat of nuclear terrorism by non-state actors if they are able to steal or buy on the black market a nuclear explosive device or the requisite fissionable materials to make one. It is necessary to strengthen confidence in mechanisms to deter the use of nuclear weapons and make the security assurances regime apply to actors outside the NPT, without appearing to confer additional status on non-NPT nuclear weapon possessors India, Israel and Pakistan .As noted above, the doctrines and policies regarding nuclear deterrence and potential use put forward by officials from some of the NWS during the two decades since the end of the cold war have given rise to serious concerns among the NNWS. In particular, the Bush administration's 2001 Nuclear Posture Review and 2002 National Security Strategy, combined with efforts to develop new types of weapon such as a nuclear-tipped bunker buster[[12]](http://www.acronym.org.uk/dd/dd90/90sa.htm" \l "en12) led many to fear that the threshold for the use of nuclear weapons was being lowered. These developments as well as the risks of nuclear terrorism have led many to conclude, as President Obama eloquently noted in Prague: "In a strange turn of history, the threat of global nuclear war has gone down, but the risk of a nuclear attack has gone up." What is needed now is a new approach to security assurances that takes into account the different kinds of nuclear threat faced by all of us and the responsibility we all share in preventing the use of nuclear weapons whomsoever is the target of such threats or attacks. We need a universal approach to security assurances that will provide genuine confidence and greater security not only to the non-nuclear-weapon states, but also to people living in states that possess nuclear weapons. We need security assurances that stigmatize and, in effect, outlaw the use of nuclear weapons for everyone, as that will be an essential step towards building "the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons" that President Obama and most governments and civil society publicly advocate. In other words, we need security assurances for everyone, with specific and shared rights, obligations and responsibilities. Chinese nuclear doctrine is guided by the no-first-use (NFU) principle and strives to maintain an effective reliable and deterrent. For Beijing, the concept of deterrence has more of a qualitative rather than quantitative connotation. Labels such as minimum or limited deterrence do not capture the essence of Chinese doctrine, which is not defined by any numerical threshold, but by the level of sufficiency that guarantees a survivable, credible, and effective counter-deterrence and second-strike capabilities. Accordingly, China continues to regard nuclear weapons as largely political and psychological instruments, rather than for actual war fighting. The foundation of Chinese nuclear doctrine is increasingly being challenged, however, by growing U.S. nuclear primacy, the U.S. commanding lead in conventional weapons, especially precision-guided munitions, and the deployment of ballistic missile defenses. These developments threaten China's limited nuclear deterrence capabilities and raise questions about the viability of the NFU principle. How Beijing responds to such challenges will determine the future of its nuclear force modernization, the role of its nuclear weapons, and the prospects for nuclear disarmament.

**Solvency – Miscalc**

**NFU stops miscalc, ANY launch would be a lose-lose scenario**

Bulletin of Atomic scientists 67 (Bulletin of Atomic scientists 1967 http://books.google.com/books?id=-QYAAAAAMBAJ&pg=PA46&lpg=PA46&dq=%22no+first+use%22+%22miscalculation%22&source=bl&ots=rJ\_8lgbS1i&sig=Dyjk8xpA3zMRDTZjbtYgEuc2siI&hl=en&ei=sDQrTuyLEpCosQPkqtzDCg&sa=X&oi=book\_result&ct=result&resnum=1&ved=0CBUQ6AEwAA#v=onepage&q&f=false)

Proposals for a no first-use-policy on the part of the military nuclear powers have been advanced many times. On the other hand, they have reflected the conviction that nuclear weapons being qualified different from all others, the clear line of demarcation between “permitted” and “forbidden” use if that between their use or non-use; and that the first time a nuclear weapon- of whatever variety and no matter how small- is used again in conflict it will break down the existing barriers and almost inevitably call forth others, thus immeasurably increasing the probability of widespread nuclear devastation, if not worldwide nuclear destruction. On the other hand, from the purely military point of view, it has been recognized that neither of the nuclear superpowers is able to achieve a nuclear victory in any meaningful sense, and that the intiation of nuclear conflict would therefore represent a measure of desperation or insanity which would insure catastrophic destruction in their own homelands. As a result, there already exists a tacit understanding among the military nuclear powers which has the effect of inhibiting the first use of nuclear weapons. Nevertheless, it may be argued that the formalization of this understanding would go far toward reassuring the rest of the world, and would lessen the dangers of nuclear would inadvertence or miscalculation

****Solvency – Miscalc****

**NFU solves the internal links to their miscalc advantages  
Johnson, ’09** (Rebecca, editor of Disarmament Diplomacy, co-founder of Acronym Institute for Disarmament, “Security Assurances for Everyone: A new Approach to Deterring the Use of Nuclear Weapons” Disarmament Diplomacy, No. 90, Spring, http://www.acronym.org.uk/dd/dd90/90sa.htm)

Declaring the use of nuclear weapons a crime against humanity would not eliminate nuclear dangers overnight, but would have major impact in taking nuclear weapons off the lustrous list of objects of political status and desire. They would then truly be treated as weapons of terror that no sane or civilized person would want or be able to use. Those clinging to nuclear deterrence need to wake up to the 21st century. As recognised by the eminent US nuclear negotiator Max Kampelman, who advised Presidents Carter and Reagan, this approach would arm the international community more effectively against terrorists and their suppliers. If you want to deter the terrorist or 'rogue' state from using nuclear weapons, as advocates of nuclear deterrence claim, one of the most effective ways, consistent with post-Nuremburg accountability and the recently-established International Criminal Court (ICC), would be to make the use of nuclear weapons a crime against humanity and hold suppliers and traffickers to account as well as governments and state and non-state leaders. Despots and terrorists most fear and hate the idea that they could be held personally accountable and subjected to a humiliating public trial and punishment. Declaring nuclear weapons use a crime against humanity would take the ICJ advice to its logical conclusion and strengthen the NPT. It would greatly reinforce deterrence, denial and nonproliferation, and provide a nondiscriminatory and humanitarian security assurance for all. That would be the 'negative' part of the new security assurances approach. It would need to go together with a positive security obligation on all states and people to render assistance to a state that is threatened or attacked with nuclear weapons and also to track down and bring to justice those responsible for the threat or use of nuclear weapons, including participants in the delivery and decision-making and suppliers or facilitators of the bomb-makers, materials, threats or attacks. Such an approach extends the commitments and responsibilities of negative and positive security assurances to everyone, not just the five NPT-recognised nuclear weapon states. Though resolution 984 advanced beyond resolution 255 in moving away from the implication that the NWS should come to countries' aid with their nuclear capabilities and in also acknowledging that they were not the only states capable of providing assistance, the traditional approach to security assurances still leaves an uncomfortable impression that the NNWS are supplicants and the NWS are granting favours because their nuclear weapons give them that power. In the 21st century, when we are trying to devalue nuclear weapons, we should not continue to endow them with magical security properties or treat their possessors as having special status with unique rights and responsibilities. Unlike the nuclear weapon convention, which would have to be negotiated multilaterally and would be likely to be complex and time-consuming, with many political, technical, verification and implementation challenges to be worked out, the process of stigmatising and outlawing the use of nuclear weapons offers opportunities for courageous leaders to take unilateral steps that build towards creating a multilateral norm. This is an important initiative that non-nuclear weapon states - and indeed citizens and public movements - can declare support for, and help to build up a strong ethical norm and create a breathing space for nuclear disarmament initiatives to take hold.

**Solvency – China/Credibility**

**CP spills over to China – solves your advantage better**

CSIS 11 (1/7/11 Kevin Kallmyer “China changing its NFU policy, Tall tale?” http://csis.org/blog/china-changing-its-no-first-use-policy-tall-tale)

Yesterday, China strongly reaffirmed its long-standing “no first use” policy, the policy that it will not initiate the use of nuclear weapons in a conflict, in response to recent reports that a Chinese military report proposed changes to it. While adjustments to China’s no first use policy could be significant and destabilizing to strategic stability, the reported military document and the specific policy changes contemplated in it are not particularly surprising, nor definite proof of a hostile China. On January 5, Kyodo News reported that the People's Liberation Army's Second Artillery Corps, the group that administers China’s nuclear forces, produced a planning document entitled “Lowering the Threshold of Nuclear Threats.” The report, as per Kyodo, says that China “must carefully consider” the first-use of nuclear weapons “if a nuclear missile-possessing country carries out a series of airstrikes against key strategic targets in our country with absolutely superior conventional weapons.” China’s Foreign Minister has responded stating that China has abided and will abide by its pledge to “never…be the first to use nuclear weapons at any time or under any circumstances,” and that “the relevant report is completely baseless and has ulterior motives.” Even if the PLA report is genuine, however, it is not particularly surprising. The alleged military document was written similar to many military documents: take a worst-case scenario and discuss potential responses. In this instance, the worst-case scenario was a full-scale conventional war between China and another major power, in which the survival of China was at stake. Specifically, three targeting scenarios were highlighted that might cause China to perceive that its survival was at stake: • If the adversary targeted population centers • If the adversary targeted China’s energy infrastructure • If the adversary targeted the Chinese government Additionally, Global Security Newswire reported that there were two additional conditions would have to be met for Chinese use of nuclear weapons. • The Chinese government must approve of the changes. The Second Artillery Corps would not be allowed to change China’s nuclear policy independently. • China would have to garner substantial support from other countries for their use of nuclear weapons These changes to China’s no first use policy, if adopted by the CCP, could potentially be worrisome for strategic stability and could represent further militarization of China’s foreign policy. For example, if this document were released in a major speech by China’s President Hu Jintao then that would be a different story. But that is not what happened. Instead, the group within the PLA that controls China’s nuclear weapons wrote a document that outlined potential scenarios where nuclear use could be contemplated. The scenarios they envisioned were reactive to events in a great power war where the survival of China was at stake, and the report confirmed the importance of civilian control of China’s nuclear assets. Additionally, the report could be seen not as a step toward nuclear use, but as means to strengthen the credibility of China’s nuclear deterrence – something that could arguably be positive for strategic stability. If a large-scale conventional war did break out, it’s much more likely that that China would threaten nuclear use, as opposed to employ nuclear use, in an attempt to de-escalate the conventional conflict. This report would be part of the strategy to make such threats credible, which might have the additional benefit of preventing a conflict from breaking out in the first place.

Solvency – Credibility (SPT)

Implementing the NFU creates a new multilateral norm

Johnson 09 (Rebecca Johnson, Spring 2009, disarmament diplomacy, http://www.acronym.org.uk/dd/dd90/90sa.htm issue no. 90 spring 2009 Security Assurances for Everyone: A New Approach to Deterring the Use of Nuclear Weapons)

Unlike the nuclear weapon convention, which would have to be negotiated multilaterally and would be likely to be complex and time-consuming, with many political, technical, verification and implementation challenges to be worked out, the process of stigmatising and outlawing the use of nuclear weapons offers opportunities for courageous leaders to take unilateral steps that build towards creating a multilateral norm. This is an important initiative that non-nuclear weapon states - and indeed citizens and public movements - can declare support for, and help to build up a strong ethical norm and create a breathing space for nuclear disarmament initiatives to take hold. It has been customary for some analysts and government officials to sneer that declaratory policy isn't worth the paper it's written on because it can be reversed. But of course most negotiated treaties also contain a withdrawal clause, which these days usually cites jeopardy to a nation's supreme national interests as a legitimate reason for leaving a treaty. In history and practice, declaratory policy depends for its effectiveness on whether it is taken up widely and embedded in customary law, norms and practice. For nuclear weapon holders, there may even be a perverse logic that they could find reassuring as they wean themselves away from nuclear reliance. As long as some nuclear weapons exist physically, everyone would know that they might be used, despite any nuclear taboo or declaration. It will take time to reduce and eliminate the existing arsenals, and while this is happening, the existence of physical weapons in storage in one or a few countries might continue to offer some form of existential deterrence (to the extent that the concept of nuclear deterrence holds at all). What this won't do is provide a status-enhancing justification for holding onto nuclear weapons for all time just in case. During the transition period prior to conclusion of a nuclear weapons treaty, the operational military and security policies of the NWS will be to all intents and purposes non-nuclear, enabling the countries concerned to develop and gain confidence in all the other tools that contribute to actual deterrence and security in the real world.

Solvency – China/Miscalc

NFU to China solves miscalc and Chinese modernization – sparks cooperative negotiations that stop accidents

Lewis 09 (Jeffrey Lewis, Dir. of Nuclear Strategy @ New America Foundation, April 2009, “Chinese Nuclear Posture,” Occasional Paper No. 15, Center for Nonprolif Studies,)

On the other hand, if China’s leaders are still driven by a “possession” mentality, then prudent U.S. diplomatic efforts might result in China limiting the scope of its current modernization to preserve the general confines of its current limited posture—a posture manifestly in the national security interest of the United States. Since China seems to keep its nuclear arsenal off alert, it is possible, for example, to imagine Chinese leaders accepting proposals to maintain nuclear weapons under various proposals for de-alerting, including in various states of disassembly that would be broadly compatible with notions of nuclear zero. At the same time, Chinese leaders continue to believe that China’s small nuclear deterrent protects China against open-ended U.S. strategic modernization that includes the development of precision conventional strike capabilities and missile defenses, particularly relying on assets based in space. Why does China’s nuclear posture look so different from those of the other nuclear weapon states? The most compelling explanation is that Chinese policy makers have tended to make decisions about China’s strategic forces that suggest a widespread belief that deterrence is achieved early and with a small number of forces. This view contrasts with the norm among Western security experts, who tend to believe that deterrence can be achieved only through difficult choices, sustained with intelligent effort, and will heavily depend on the technical details. This is the view expressed in Albert Wohlstetter’s 1958 Rand monograph (and later an article in Foreign Affairs),The Delicate Balance of Terror, which helped to shape the dominant Cold War attitudes in the United States about deterrence.4A different view is that, beyond a certain point, the technical details matter very little, if at all. The balance of terror is anything but delicate. An enemy who *can* be deterred, *will* be deterred by the prospect of a counterattack, even if it consists of only a few nuclear weapons. Drawing on his experience during the Cuban Missile Crisis, McGeorge Bundy later argued that decision makers are unlikely to “double-check the detailed consequences of an exchange, or to review how such a war might be fought.” National leaders are likely to have “a healthy disrespect for such exercises,” recognizing that the avoidance of a nuclear war is imperative.5 Mao’s famous remark that “The atomic bomb is a paper tiger” is oft en treated as evidence of a dangerous irrationality in Chinese attitudes toward nuclear weapons. But, as Mark Ryan found in his study of the formation of Chinese attitudes about nuclear weapons during the Korean War, the first generation of Chinese Communist leaders formed highly accurate assessments about the physical limitations of nuclear weapons and the political constraints on the U.S. use of nuclear weapons.6 Having successfully endured nuclear threats from the United States, Chinese leaders saw nuclear weapons as tools of political coercion that could be met with resolve and, eventually, possession of similar capabilities. Some context may be helpful. Chinese Communist leaders first used the term “paper tiger” to refer to reactionaries, not nuclear weapons, in 1946. The reference is a metaphorical allusion to “an older Maoist revolutionary maxim which holds that men and politics, rather than weapons and economic power, are the determining factors in war.”7 In context, referring to nuclear weapons as paper tigers merely indicates that the balance of nuclear weapons is not likely to be decisive in conflict—a statement that the technical details matter very little. Calling nuclear weapons paper tigers is simply the “healthy disrespect” that Bundy predicted any world leader would have for plans to fight a nuclear war. It is perhaps no more colorful than similar remarks by U.S. and Soviet leaders.8 Of course, even if world leaders talk about nuclear weapons as though the details don’t matter very much, the United States and the Soviet Union still expended enormous efforts tending to those details during the Cold War, deploying very large, diverse, and highly alert forces. The bureaucratic realities of China’s nuclear weapons development, however, were different and seem to have reinforced the tendency toward minimalism suggested by the ideological description of nuclear weapons as paper tigers.

Aff – Turn

**US nuclear freedom is key to US heg and stop extinction.**

Gerson 10 (Michael S. Gerson is a research analyst at the Center for Naval Analyses (CNA), in Alexandria, Virginia. “No First Use” International Security, Vol. 35, No. 2 (Fall 2010)

A persistent theme in U.S. nuclear weapons policy is that the United States has always retained the option to use nuclear weapons first in conflict. The threat of nuclear first use played a key role in NATO’s military strategy throughout the Cold War, and even after the collapse of the Soviet Union, successive U.S. administrations have retained—implicitly or explicitly—the first-use option. Yet, in a speech in Prague on April 5, 2009, President Barack Obama pledged to “put an end to Cold War thinking” and to “reduce the role of nuclear weapons in our national security strategy, and urge others to do the same.”1 This commitment, coupled with President Obama’s embrace of the vision of a nuclear weapons–free world, appeared to foreshadow important changes in U.S. nuclear policy—especially declaratory policy—in the administration’s much-anticipated The NPR, however, missed the opportunity to effect meaningful change in U.S. nuclear policy. In reality, the NPR’s new declaratory formulation changes little from the past, as the United States can still threaten the first use of nuclear weapons in a variety of circumstances. The NPR declares that the “fundamental role” of U.S. nuclear weapons is for deterrence; that nuclear weapons would be used only “in extreme circumstances to defend the vital interests of the United States or its allies and partners”; and that “the United States will not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear states that are party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and in compliance with their nuclear non-proliferation obligations.”3 However, to contend that the “fundamental” purpose of U.S. nuclear weapons is deterrence does not mean that this is their only purpose. The NPR deliberately leaves open the option for the United States to use nuclear weapons to launch a preemptive—or, less likely, a preventive—ªfirst strike against Chinese, North Korean, Russian, and (perhaps) future Iranian nuclear forces. Equally important, the United States can still threaten the first use of nuclear weapons to deter and, if necessary, respond, to a variety of nonnuclear contingencies, including large-scale conventional aggression by another nuclear power such as China or Russia, and biological or chemical threats from states such as Iran and North Korea.4 Finally, by failing to specify the circumstances under which the United States might use nuclear weapons and instead only stipulating that nuclear weapons would be used in “extreme circumstances” to protect “vital interests,” the NPR has retained much of the imprecision and vagueness that was the hallmark of the previous declaratory policy, commonly known as “calculated ambiguity.” In this sense, the NPR’s new declaratory policy is little more than calculated ambiguity by another name